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Abstract 
 
Despite the general academic consensus that liberal democracy has 
triumphed over communism, Marxist-inspired movements continue to thrive across 
the global south. This is a curious phenomenon in the post-Cold War era. This 
paper explores the recent growth of both The Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia and the Naxalite-Maoist Insurgency in India, and compares the two 
groups. It analyzes the factors that have led to their resurgence, in particular, the 
political and economic dimensions. Specifically, it addresses the impact of two 
dominant factors in fomenting their resurgence: neo-liberalism and political 
exclusion. First, recent growth of both groups seems to correlate with the adoption 
of neo-liberal economic policies and progressively draconian structural 
adjustments, which aggravated existing poverty and inequality, in their respective 
countries. Second, recent growth of both groups seems to correlate with political 
exclusion of marginalized groups, an exclusion increasingly enforced by state 
violence. The survival and growth of Marxist-inspired armed movements across the 
globe also raises important questions about the future of liberal democracy. This 
paper asks whether the persistence of Marxist-inspired movements across the 
global south has given the lie to the "end of history" theory, and what their 
resurgence says, if anything, about the "clash of civilizations theory. It concludes 
that the success of these movements challenges the apparent triumph of liberal 
democracy in both Colombia and India, and perhaps in the post-Cold War era 
globally.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1991, the Soviet Union finally collapsed, bringing to an end decades of 
conflict between liberal democracy in the West and communist regimes in the East. 
This was a war fought not just on the battlefield, but also in the halls of academia 
and in the public imagination. These early years were heady times, when countries 
across the globe bowed to the inevitability of capitalism and adopted neo-liberal 
economic reforms alongside democratization. The future seemed bright and many 
came to believe that we were witnessing the end of mankind's ideological 
evolution, or "the end of history." 
However, one need only look to the global south to realize that reports of 
the death of Marxism may be exaggerated. Across the Third World, Marxist and 
Maoist-inspired movements have been flourishing since the end of the Cold War, 
from the Zapatistas in Mexico to the Bolivarian Alliance in Venezuela, Bolivia, 
Ecuador, Nicaragua and Cuba, to Nepal, where competing communist parties – 
including a former Maoist rebel group – have dominated the legislature and 
executive in the post-monarchy era. Marxist guerrilla armies also continue to 
operate around the world, including the Kurdistan Worker's Party in Turkey, the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (FARC-EP) and the 
Naxalite-Maoist insurgency in India. And, lest one think that these seemingly 
anachronistic groups are marginal and increasingly irrelevant, many of these 
insurgencies are actually increasing in membership, in territory, and in military 
effectiveness.1  
The subjects of this paper, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC) and the Naxalite-Maoist insurgency, have both seen a particularly strong 
resurgence in the post-Cold War era. FARC's membership is estimated as high as 
18 000 combatants and as recently as 2008 was reported to control about 40 
percent of Colombian territory.2 Similarly, the Naxalite insurgency now controls at 
least 92 000 square kilometers in eastern India, has an influential presence in about 
                                                       
1 Walker and Grey, Historical Dictionary, xxxv. 
2 Walker and Grey, Historical Dictionary, xxxv; James J. Brittain, "The FARC-EP in Colombia: A 
Revolutionary Exception in an Age of Imperialist Expansion," Monthly Review: An Independent 
Socialist Magazine 57 (2005): 20-33; James J. Brittain, "The Continuity of FARC-EP Resistance in 
Colombia," Counterpunch 1 Aug 2008. 
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one third of the country, and has an armed wing that is 20 000 strong, with a further 
40 000 full-time cadres.3 In both cases, these groups have become so entrenched 
that the guerillas have assumed many government functions, including running 
schools, building roads, and administering courts of law.4  
So, despite the general academic and public consensus that liberal 
democracy has triumphed over communism, it appears that across the global south, 
Marxist-inspired movements continue to thrive. This is a curious circumstance, and 
it is surely worth investigating why this phenomenon is a feature of the post-Cold 
War era.  
 
1.1 Definitions 
Throughout this paper, the term “liberal democracy” refers to those forms 
of government in which representative democracy operates under the principles of 
liberalism, that is, the rights of the individual are broadly protected and enshrined 
in law. Liberal democracy is characterized, at least ostensibly, by fair, free, and 
competitive elections between multiple distinct political parties, the separation of 
powers into different branches of government, rule of law, and the equal protection 
of human rights and civil liberties for all people. Liberal democracies often draw 
on a written or unwritten constitution to define and limit the powers of government.  
This understanding of liberal democracy is far from controversial. 
However, in the view of this author, liberal democracy has in practice an economic 
component. Liberal democracies are often assumed to operate alongside and in 
concert with a capitalist economy. Indeed, capitalism has some ideological 
resonance with the principles of liberalism, which privileges the rights of the 
individual (including an individual’s property rights). Liberal democracy may 
therefore be distinguished from “social democracy”, in which a democratic 
political system operates alongside a socialist or command economy. 
(Alternatively, the term social democracy may describe policy regimes wherein a 
universal welfare state and collective bargaining schemes operate within a 
capitalist economy, especially when referring to the models prominent in Western 
                                                       
3 Arundhati Roy, “Walking with the Comrades,” Outlook India, 29 March 2010. 
4 Roy, “Walking with the Comrades”. 
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and Northern Europe during the later half of the 20th century). This paper takes the 
position that it is practically difficult, if not impossible, to separate liberal 
democracy from the capitalist context within which it operates. In the post-Cold 
War era, that capitalism is of a particularly radical, neo-liberal flavor.  
The term “neo-liberalism”, as it is currently used, was introduced in the 
1980s in connection with Augusto Pinochet’s economic reforms in Chile. Those 
reforms were largely planned and directed by economists at the University of 
Chicago, including such leading thinkers as Milton Friedman.5 Neo-liberalism is a 
current form of economic liberalism that draws on neoclassical economic theory 
and advocates economic liberalization, privatization, free trade, open markets, 
deregulation, reductions in government spending, and a greater role for the private 
sector in the economy. The term is widely used to denote a rather radical version of 
laissez-faire capitalism, and is sometimes used derogatively by opponents of 
market reforms. While the shift to neo-liberalism in the post-Cold War period has 
not been universal or monolithic, it is nevertheless global and nearly ubiquitous. 
And, while not all liberal democratic states have experienced the neo-liberal shift in 
the same way, even countries with a strong social democratic tradition have moved 
to the right since the end of the Cold War (including Canada and Northern 
European states). This process has been especially pronounced since the financial 
crisis of 2008, which prompted the introduction of austerity measures across 
Europe. 
 
1.2 Focus, Objectives and Research Questions 
 This thesis focuses on the recent resurgence of both The Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia and the Naxalite-Maoist insurgency in India, and 
compares the two groups. It analyzes the factors that have led to their resurgence, 
and determines whether they are similar in both cases. In particular, this thesis 
focuses on the political and economic dimensions of the resurgence. Specifically, it 
                                                       
5 Milton Friedman was a leading neo-liberal thinker, and his work proved enormously influential in 
both academic and policy circles. For more information, see e.g. Milton Friedman, Capitalism and 
Freedom: 40th Anniversary Ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002) and Milton Friedman 
and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States 1867-1960 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1965).  
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addresses the impact of two dominant factors and their roles in fomenting the 
resurgence: neo-liberalism and political exclusion. First, the recent resurgence of 
both groups seems to correlate with the adoption of neo-liberal economic policies 
and progressively draconian structural adjustments, which aggravated existing 
poverty and inequality. Second, the recent resurgence of both groups seems to 
correlate with the increasing political exclusion of marginalized groups, enforced 
both by the implementation of anti-democratic laws, and by state violence. 
The survival and resurgence of Marxist-inspired armed movements across 
the globe raises important questions about the future of liberal democracy. Has the 
persistence of Marxist-inspired movements across the global south given the lie to 
the "end of history" theory? What does their resurgence say, if anything, about the 
"clash of civilizations theory? What will the future hold for these groups and for 
their respective countries? Each of these important questions can be explored 
through a comparison of FARC in Colombia and the Naxalite insurgency in India. 
This research also contributes to literature in the field, since these two case studies 
have not been compared before.  
 
1.3 Methodology 
 Data for this thesis has been compiled from multiple sources, including 
both quantitative and qualitative data from primary and secondary sources. 
However, this research emphasizes qualitative data. Quantitative data is limited to 
economic and development indicators for both Colombia and India, including data 
published by the United Nations, World Bank, and organizations such as Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch. Most of the data relied upon is qualitative, 
including secondary sources such as books and journal articles, and primary 
sources including media reports, press interviews, autobiographies and materials 
published by both insurgent groups. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In the vacuum left by the collapse of the Soviet Union, academics and 
public figures scrambled to find – perhaps invent – the defining paradigm of the 
post-Cold War era. The earliest theory to fill the void was the "end of history" 
thesis, which posited that with the triumph of liberal democracy, we had witnessed 
the end of mankind's ideological evolution and ideological conflict. The most 
famous proponent of this theory is Francis Fukuyama, who in 1992 published The 
End of History and the Last Man. Fukuyama argued that Marxism was defeated, 
discredited and "totally exhausted."6 Most academics agreed that Marxism as an 
ideology was in terminal crisis, the destruction of the Soviet Union had marked its 
death, and it was time to "return Marx to the nineteenth century where he 
belongs."7 
  Soon after, however, others began to propose that the post-Cold War era 
would be defined by conflict as before, except that rather than being driven by 
political or economic ideology, this conflict would be cultural and religious in 
nature. Conflict would henceforth occur between "civilizations" with 
fundamentally opposing values. In 1992, Benjamin Barber published "Jihad vs. 
McWorld", in which he examined fault lines between liberal democracy and 
traditional religious, cultural and ethnic values.8 Also published in 1992 was 
Samuel Huntington's infamous Clash of Civilizations, which argued that cultural 
and religious identities would be the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold 
War era.9 In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks the paradigm of 
eternal cultural conflict, particularly between fundamentalist Islam and "the West", 
has become received wisdom.  
While fundamentalist Islam certainly presents an ideological challenge to 
liberal democracy – one that has significant currency throughout much of the world 
– many scholars are nevertheless highly critical of the "clash of civilizations" 
                                                       
6 Walker and Grey, Historical Dictionary, xxxiv. 
7 Walker and Grey, Historical Dictionary, xxxiv. 
8 Benjamin Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld (New York: Times Books, 1995). 
9 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1996). 
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theory, and rightly so. In Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny, Amartya 
Sen criticized Huntington’s portrayal of monolithic "civilizations" and the failure 
to recognize the diversity of identities both within those civilizations and within 
each individual member.10 Edward Said was also strongly critical of the idea of 
"fixed civilizations" and of the notion that races of people have disparate 
psychologies and destinies. In "The Clash of Ignorance," Said argued that this was 
an "imagined geography" that amounted to a theoretical legitimization of American 
wars of aggression, and would prove to be a self-fulfilling prophecy.11 Regardless 
of this widespread criticism of its concepts, methodology and implications, and 
lack of empirical evidence, the "clash of civilizations" theory has remained 
influential, especially in American policy circles.12  
Of course, despite the apparent flaws of the "clash of civilizations" theory, 
Fukuyama's "end of history" theory seems premature by comparison. Aside from 
the implicit criticisms of Huntington and Berber, there are many other critics. Azar 
Gat, for example, argued in "The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers" that China 
and Russia, operating as authoritarian capitalist regimes, present a viable rival 
model to liberal democracy.13 Hugo Chavez also argued against the theory (which 
he called "American hegemonic pretensions") and in favor of his own philosophy 
of Bolivarianism, which extolls economic sovereignty and self-sufficiency, 
grassroots political participation and more equitable distribution of wealth. 14 
Marxists, environmentalists and anarchists are, of course, also highly critical.15  
The liberal-democratic apotheosis is also under siege in the real world by 
governments and global movements seemingly allied against the destined end of 
history. In "The Backlash Against Democracy Promotion", Thomas Carothers 
documents a rising tide of governments that have denounced democracy promotion 
as political meddling and American interventionism. Russia and a handful of post-
Soviet states, China, Venezuela, Nepal and others, have denounced Western “pro-
                                                       
10 Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny (New York: Norton, 2006), xi-xiv. 
11 Edward Said, “The Clash of Ignorance”, Nation 273 (2001): 11-13. 
12 Paul Berman, Terror and Liberalism (New York: Norton, 2004), 15-21. 
13 Azar Gat, “The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers," Foreign Affairs 86 (2007): 51. 
14 Hugo Chavez, "Address to the United Nations" 20 September 2006, 
CommonDreams.org. http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0920-22.htm. 
15 Ralph Miliband, "Fukuyama and the Socialist Alternative," New Left Review 193 (1992). 
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democracy” NGOs as threats to their sovereignty and have had them expelled or 
tightly controlled.16  The neo-liberal shift triggered by the triumph of liberal 
democracy is also under attack from the ill-named "anti-globalization movement", 
a diverse collection of labour organizations, landless peoples' and peasants' 
movements, anti-poverty and human rights groups. This loose network of activists 
has for decades opposed neo-liberal policies and attracted widespread, if lukewarm, 
public sympathy. Prominent academics, writers, activists and economists are allied 
to the cause, including Noam Chomsky, Arundhati Roy, Naomi Klein, Vandana 
Shiva and Joseph Stiglitz.17 The critics have only become louder in the wake of the 
2008 global financial crisis. Such a fierce rejection of liberal democracy by its own 
intelligentsia, deep in the democratic heartland, is surely a curious development in 
the wake of the final defeat of communism. 
However, while fighting words have been hurled back and forth over 
Fukuyama's prophecy of the end of history, virtually no ink has been spilled 
questioning the foundational assumption of his theory: that Marxism is dead and 
Reagan killed it. As early as 1993, the eminent philosopher Jacques Derrida 
questioned this assumption and its durability. In Specters of Marx, he argued that 
with the fall of the Soviet Union, Marx's philosophy and radical critiques (though 
not communism itself) had become more relevant than ever.18 Derrida remarked on 
the West's smug self-satisfaction, and was especially critical of Fukuyama's 
evangelism of liberal democracy, writing: 
...never have violence, inequality, exclusion, famine, and thus economic 
oppression affected as many human beings in the history of the earth and of 
humanity. Instead of singing the advent of the ideal of liberal democracy 
and of the capitalist market in the euphoria of the end of history...let us 
never neglect this obvious macroscopic fact... never before, in absolute 
                                                       
16 Thomas Carothers, "The Backlash Against Democracy Promotion," Foreign Affairs 85 
(2006): 55-68.  
17 Noam Chomsky, "Globalization Marches On," In These Times 26 Mar 2010; and Arundhati Roy, 
Listening to Grasshoppers: Field Notes on Democracy, (Toronto: Penguin, 2009); and Naomi 
Klein, "Reclaiming the Commons," New Left Review 9 (2001); and Vandana Shiva, Earth 
Democracy: Justice, Sustainability and Peace (London: Zed Books, 2006); and Joseph Stiglitz, 
Globalization and its Discontents (London: W.W. Norton, 2003). 
18 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New 
International, Trans by Peggy Kamuf (London: Routledge, 1994), 85. 
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figures, have so many men, women and children been subjugated, starved 
or exterminated on the earth.19 
 
For Derrida, Fukuyama's End of History and the Last Man served as an intellectual 
fig leaf for Western hegemony and for the "new gospel" of liberal democracy, 
while Fukuyama's newfound celebrity was merely a symptom of the rush to declare 
Marx dead. Derrida also called for the creation of a "New International", an 
informal alliance of people and institutions inspired by Marxism, so as to renew 
and radicalize Marxist criticism.20 
Derrida's critique of the "end of history" theory and his call for the creation 
of a global "new-left" is particularly salient because it predicts the rise of the anti-
globalization movement, and even dares to suggest that Marxist philosophy and 
radical Marxist groups could survive in the post-Cold War era. Marxist and Maoist-
inspired movements have indeed expanded in the global south, including armed 
movements.21 The subjects of this paper, FARC in Colombia and the Naxalite-
Maoist insurgency in India – both classic Marxist and Maoist revolutionary groups 
with their origins in the 1960s – are actually growing in membership, territory and 
influence, despite the virtual academic consensus that they are doomed to the 
dustbin of history.  
Colombia and India are both regarded by Western states, including the 
United States and Canada, as examples of liberal democratic government22 and 
both have aggressively pursued neo-liberal economic policies since the early 
1990s. The growth of armed Marxist-inspired rebel groups within their borders, 
however, raises uncomfortable questions about the future of liberal democracy in 
those countries. It challenges the end of history theory, since FARC guerillas and 
Naxalite insurgents feel both un-served by existing democratic institutions and 
                                                       
19 Derrida, Specters of Marx, 85. 
20 Derrida, Specters of Marx, 86. 
21 Walker and Grey, Historical Dictionary, xxxv. 
22 See e.g. Sheldon Oliver, “Canadian Free Trade Report Ignores Human Rights Abuses in 
Colombia: Amnesty International” Colombia Reports 23 May 2014. 
http://colombiareports.co/canadian-free-trade-report-ignores-human-rights-abuses-colombia-
amnesty-international/. Both the United States and Canada consider Colombia a close ally and 
valuable trade partner. (The Canada-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (CCOFTA) went into effect 
in 2011.) Despite persistent government corruption and widespread human rights violations 
connected to the narco-state, successive Colombian regimes have been lauded as positive examples 
of liberal democracy by Western governments.  
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victimized by neo-liberal economic reforms. It also challenges the clash of 
civilizations theory, since these are culturally, ethnically and religiously diverse 
groups united by shared political and economic goals. So, what does this 
phenomenon mean for liberal democracy in the age of neo-liberal globalization? 
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CHAPTER 3: THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA 
 
3.1 History Until 1990 
After a long struggle plagued by set-backs and military defeats, Colombia 
finally gained independence from Spain in 1821 as part of Gran Colombia, a union of 
liberated Venezuela, Colombia, Panama and Ecuador. The great hero of the war, 
Simon Bolivar, ruled as its first president from the capital Bogota. While Bolivar 
desired a strong, centralist authority in Gran Colombia, federalists urged dissolution 
and more democratic governance. Soon after Bolivar’s death, Colombia did separate 
and a prominent federalist, Francisco de Paula Santander, became its next president. 
Santander built Colombia’s first legal framework and system of finance, founded 
schools, and challenged the influence of the church in education and public life. His 
allies became known as “liberals”, in opposition to the centralists, clergy and 
religious laity, who identified as “conservatives”. 23  Over the next century, 
Colombian politics and society were dominated by the Conservative and Liberal 
parties, each representing different factions of the same wealthy and connected 
national elite. During this period, Liberal and Conservative supporters fought a series 
of extremely violent civil wars. Party loyalty remained one of the principal anchors 
of Colombian identity for much of the 20th century.24  
Colombia in the first half of the twentieth century was characterized by an 
economic and political context similar to that of today. Colombia experienced a 
phase of economic modernization and integration into the global economy, driven by 
a booming export market for coffee and growing American investment. However, the 
benefits of economic growth were distributed highly unequally, and poverty 
indicators actually worsened during this period. Three percent of landholders owned 
more than half of Colombia's agricultural land and by the early 1940s Colombia's 
gini coefficient had risen from 0.45 to 0.53, indicating a significant increase in 
maldistribution of wealth.25 During this period, the popularization of socialist ideas 
was also changing the political landscape, and Colombia’s agricultural and urban 
                                                       
23 Geoff Simmons, Colombia: A Brutal History (London: SAQI, 2004), 23-25. 
24 James Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America (London: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 90. 
25 Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries, 92-95. 
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workforces began to radicalize. The 1920s in particular saw a number of strikes by 
urban workers and land invasions by peasant organizations.26 Looking back, scholars 
have attributed this radicalization to "accentuated economic inequality and obvious 
political fraud."27 
Also throughout this time, hostility between the Liberal and Conservative 
parties continued to mount. After over a decade out of power, the Conservative Party 
retook the presidency in 1946. The Liberal Party split into two factions. The Leftist 
faction was led by Jorge Gaitán, an extremely popular figure who criticized 
economic inequality and concentration of political power. In 1948, Gaitán was 
assassinated in the streets of Bogotá, sparking a 10-year civil war between Liberal 
and Conservative supporters. La Violencia, as it was known, saw between 100 000 
and 300 000 political murders, and stands out as the bloodiest period in Colombia’s 
remarkably violent history.28  
Colombia’s first guerrilla groups emerged organically out of self-defense 
organizations (cuadrillas) established by Liberal Party supporters during La 
Violencia.29 These roaming, loosely organized groups were established by ordinary 
citizens to protect their neighborhoods and villages from violence meted out by the 
governing Conservative Party.30 Many were well provisioned, and may have been 
financed by the National Liberal Executive and wealthy Liberal individuals. The 
guerilla movement was especially influential in the eastern plains, where Liberal 
guerrillas controlled vast swaths of territory. Meanwhile, in the central departments 
such as Tolima and Cundinamarca, a nascent communist guerrilla movement was 
emerging.31 
In 1953, General Rojas Pinilla assumed power in a coup d’état. Pinilla’s 
promises of peace, and economic and political change, led Liberal guerrilla factions 
                                                       
26 Michael Taussig, Law in a Lawless Land: Diary of a Limpieza in Colombia (New York: New 
Press, 2003), 191-196. 
27 Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries, 92-95. 
28 Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries, 94-96. 
29 Taussig, Law in a Lawless Land, 191-196. 
30 Rony Pshisva and Gustavo Suarez, “Captive Markets: The Impact of Kidnappings on Corporate 
Investment in Colombia,” Finance and Economics Discussion Series: Divisions of Research and 
Statistics and Monetary Affairs, Federal Reserve Board, Washington D.C. February 2006: 6. 
31 FARC-EP Historical Outline, Toronto: International Commission of Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia People's Army, 1999: 10-12. 
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to demobilize. Only communist guerrilla groups were unconvinced by Pinilla’s 
promises and remained in the field. (Former Liberal guerrillas were later targeted for 
assassination.) 32  Consequently, by 1955 Colombia’s guerrilla movement had 
radicalized and was effectively dominated by communists.33  
La Violencia ended in 1958 with the formation of the National Front, a 
coalition government in which Liberals and Conservatives shared congressional seats 
equally and alternated the presidency every four years. While it finally put an end to 
civil war, the National Front also entrenched the power of Colombia's ruling elite. 
The coalition allowed Liberals and Conservatives to work together to exclude other 
segments of Colombian society from the political process, including the emergent 
middle class, the political Left and, especially, impoverished peasants and urban 
workers. To this end, a wave of state repression was unleashed on labour unions, 
student groups and peasant organizations throughout the 1960s.34  
The National Front also presided over staggering levels of poverty and 
inequality. A 1950 World Bank report35 on Colombia noted high rates of infant 
mortality, illiteracy and overcrowding, as well as a lack of public services and credit, 
and low energy consumption. Agricultural workers, who accounted for slightly more 
than half of the active labour force, were particularly impoverished, suffering from 
extremely low incomes and poor nutrition. The World Bank report emphasized that 
despite economic growth, improvement of development indicators was lower than 
expected. 36  These economic and political conditions – political exclusion and 
increasing poverty – were driving factors in the survival and growth of the 
communist guerrilla movement in its early years. 
Indeed, the marriage of the Liberal and Conservative parties and their failure 
to enact any significant land reform, coupled with the outlawing of the Communist 
Party, contributed to a sense amongst many marginalized groups that the communist 
                                                       
32 FARC-EP Historical Outline, 10-12. 
33 FARC-EP Historical Outline, 10-12. 
34 Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries, 94-96. 
35 World Bank, 1950 Appendix, Vol. 3 of The basis of a development program for Colombia, 
Washington, DC: World Bank in Frank Safford and Marco Palacios, Colombia: Fragmented Land, 
Divided Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 306-307. 
36 World Bank 1950 The basis of a development program for Colombia in Safford and Palacios, 
Colombia, 306-307. 
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guerrilla movement was the only credible political alternative in Colombia. The 
guerillas called for more equitable land distribution, the nationalization of strategic 
industries and, naturally, for "breaking the yoke of imperialist domination."37 The 
movement was based in the southwestern departments of Tolima, Cauca and Huila, 
and counted tens of thousands of supporters among the rural peasantry. Despite a 
vicious counter-insurgency campaign, the guerrillas settled into remote rural areas 
and continued to repulse advances by the Colombian army.38  
In 1964, FARC was formally established as the official armed wing of the 
Colombian Communist Party. It was initially composed of a group of 48 men under 
the leadership of Manuel Marulanda Vélez, a former liberal guerrilla.39 That same 
year, senators, party leaders and the military high command began to stir up public 
hysteria against “independent republics”, those areas of the country still controlled by 
the fragmented guerrilla movement. In May, President Guillermo León Valencia 
inaugurated Operation Marquetalia as part of Plan LASO (Latin American Security 
Operation) – the largest military operation yet carried out in Colombia – to eliminate 
the guerrilla threat.40  
Despite the government’s best efforts, however, FARC survived and 
continued to grow. In July, in the midst of fighting in Marquetalia, FARC proclaimed 
the Agrarian Program, the centerpiece of its political platform.41 In these early days, 
FARC’s social base was composed of peasants and settlers (colonos), particularly in 
the south and in western Amazonia. FARC developed strong ties with rural 
communities by protecting their land from appropriation by large landowners, and by 
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compelling landlords to pay labourers fair wages.42 Although it remained but one of 
many leftist guerrilla groups in the country, FARC became, by far, the largest 
professional guerrilla force in Colombia.43 
In the early 1980s, the Colombian public called for the government to 
negotiate peace with the guerrillas. Negotiations were opened by Conservative 
President Belisario Betancur Cuartas and were initially successful, achieving an 
agreement in principle from FARC and other groups to renounce violence and enter 
democratic politics.44 Following the 1984 peace agreement, FARC was invited to 
participate in upcoming Congressional elections. Under the direction of the 
Communist Party, FARC established its own political wing, the Unión Patriótica 
(UP) party, and campaigned in the election.45  
However, UP members were quickly targeted by paramilitary death squads 
allied with the government. In the run-up to the 1986 elections, as many as 4 000 UP 
leaders, members and supporters were assassinated. Despite winning fourteen 
Congressional seats, this decimation of the civilian leadership destroyed the 
Communist Party in Colombia and ended FARC’s brief turn to legitimate politics.46 
In the aftermath, other guerrilla groups withdrew from their own ongoing peace 
negotiations, and FARC resumed its operations in June 1987.47 Subsequent attempts 
to negotiate peace, most recently during the Uribe administration, also failed.48 These 
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experiences cemented FARC's distrust of, and frustration with, the non-violent 
political path. 
The economic and political conditions which led to FARC’s formation in the 
1960s – poverty and political exclusion enforced by violence – would also lead to its 
dramatic growth in the post-Cold War era.  
 
3.2 Organization 
FARC is now the largest professional guerilla army in Colombia and in the 
Americas.49 At the time of its founding in 1964, FARC was composed of just 46 
men.50 By the first decade of the twenty-first century, its membership is estimated to 
be as high as 18 000 combatants.51 The movement is led by a seven-member 
Secretariat and has maintained remarkably consistent leadership over many 
decades.52 Manuel Marulanda avoided capture despite a $5 million bounty on his 
head and died of a heart attack in 2008.53 He was replaced as commander-in-chief by 
Alfonso Cano, a bookish former student activist and FARC’s long-time chief 
negotiator. Cano himself was killed in early November 2011 at the age of 63, when 
the Colombian military bombed his jungle camp in Cauca.54 He was replaced as 
leader by Timoleón “Timochenko” Jiménez.55 
Much of FARC’s senior leadership is of rather advanced age. In contrast, 
FARC's rank and file membership is young and reflects the diversity of Colombian 
society. While FARC began as a rural, peasant-based organization, its membership 
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has grown to include indigenous and Afro-Colombians, displaced peoples, urban 
intellectuals, union members and other sectors of the urban workforce.56 Much of the 
rank-and-file membership are teenagers and twenty-somethings. 57  FARC has 
received widespread criticism for employing child soldiers and, in response, 
announced that it would dismiss soldiers younger than 15 years of age from its ranks. 
Nevertheless, the Colombian army claims it continues to capture younger 
combatants.58 
The number of FARC members who are women is astonishing. Some 
reports indicate that 45% of FARC members and commandantes are women.59 
Other sources estimate the absolute number of female members to be over 5 000, or 
about one third of the total force.60 In any case, the proportion is significant. 
FARC has been able to maintain an unusually large and effective professional 
force because it is financially healthy. Its annual operating budget is estimated at 
roughly $500 million.61 FARC raises funds by extorting transnational corporations – 
particularly those working in Colombia's energy and extractive sectors – and by 
kidnapping foreigners and high-profile politicians, holding them until ransom 
demands are met.62 During the 1990s, Colombia achieved the unfortunate distinction 
of having both the world’s highest absolute number of kidnappings and the world’s 
highest kidnapping rate. Paramilitaries and drug cartels also frequently kidnap, but 
according to the Colombian Ministry of Defense, about 56% of kidnappings are 
attributable to FARC and other guerrillas, with over half being for the purpose of 
collecting ransom.63 
More significantly, FARC has been widely accused of fundraising through 
cocaine production and drug trafficking, and has been targeted by numerous 
American counter-insurgency operations conducted under the guise of the War on 
Drugs. FARC is, indeed, involved in the narcotics industry. FARC taxes coca 
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production in areas under its control. (In true leftist style, it is a progressive system 
that exempts small producers while taxing large plantations as well as refiners of 
coca paste and cocaine, importers of processing chemicals, and transportation of the 
finished product.) Taxation of the coca industry is estimated to account for between 
40% and 70% of FARC’s budget. Reports also indicate that FARC is taking a more 
active role in the industry by, among other things, building paste factories and 
airstrips, and overseeing the monopolization of coca leaf purchases.64 FARC is 
apparently heavily invested. In 2011, Colombian police reportedly seized a FARC-
owned submarine in Buenaventura. Believed to be used for drug smuggling, the 16 
metre long vessel was estimated to cost US$2 million and could hold a crew of 
five.65 
However, while FARC's resurgence did occur alongside the growth of the 
Colombian drug trade, its relationship to it is more complicated than many 
acknowledge. Its involvement was partly spurred by the widespread turn to coca 
production by small farmers and coffee growers during the 1990s. FARC protected 
their interests by, among other things, compelling traffickers to pay fair market prices 
for coca leaves and labour.66 In 1999, FARC participated in a United Nations project 
to replace coca farming with alternative forms of legal economic development. In 
2000, the representative for the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Klaus 
Nyholm, stated, "Guerillas are something different than the traffickers…in some 
areas, they're not involved at all. And in others, they actively tell the farmers not to 
grow coca."67 In fact, both the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and 
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) reject the characterization of FARC as Colombia's 
primary drug traffickers.68 
Additionally, the Council on Hemispheric Affairs has found evidence of 
extensive drug smuggling by Colombia’s armed forces, key financial figures and 
senior government bureaucrats, all in collaboration with paramilitary groups that 
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control the most important drug trafficking networks in Colombia. 69  In 1996, 
President Ernesto Sampar received campaign donations from drug traffickers, 
leading the United States to “decertify” the Colombian government.70 In February 
2007, five politicians were arrested for ties to "paramilitary cocaine-trafficking 
squads," including the brother of Colombia's Foreign Minister.71 Indeed, some 
scholars argue that economic growth created by the drug trade has led to the 
development of a “narco-state” in Colombia controlled by a “narco-bourgeoisie”, and 
that the counter-insurgency war is partly driven by the state’s desire to monopolize 
production and distribution of narcotics.72 The point here is that cocaine production 
and drug trafficking are an important part of the Colombian economy in which 
virtually every sector of society either directly participates or is otherwise entangled. 
FARC and other guerilla groups are not a nefarious exception to the rule, and surely 
cannot be held to a higher legal or ethical standard than the Colombian government 
itself.73 
Despite its remarkable longevity and recruiting success, FARC has been 
criticized for a simultaneous failure to develop a "sophisticated political-ideological 
package" or clear alternative development model.74 These criticisms may be unfair.75 
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In its voluminous literature76, FARC does outline a number of salient criticisms of 
the Colombian state, neo-liberal economic reforms, and economic and class inequity. 
It has criticized the state as a "false democracy" that presides over a highly 
exclusionary political process, and attacked government corruption. It has also 
condemned state-sanctioned human rights abuses and the government’s warm 
relationship with paramilitary groups.77 
Because FARC has always drawn support from the rural poor, it has 
constructed a political platform that addresses the peasantry’s concerns.78 FARC 
officially defined its policy and objectives in July 1964 when it published The 
Agrarian Program of the Guerrillas79, its primary political platform. It was corrected 
and reissued in 1993 by the 8th National Conference. In it, FARC calls for major land 
reforms, including the confiscation of land from large landowners and free 
distribution to “peasants who work it or want to work it.” Tenant farmers, occupants, 
renters, sharecroppers and labourers would receive property titles for the land they 
work, and all systems of sharecropping and rent in money or in kind would be 
eliminated. (The property of affluent farmers who worked their own land, however, 
would be respected.)80  
The program also outlines a system of agrarian credit, subsidies, technical 
assistance and guaranteed prices for agricultural products. In addition to the 
provision of health and education services in rural areas (many of which lack social 
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services entirely), irrigation and electrification systems would be extended to remote 
rural areas. The program also proposes to erase all the debts owed by peasants to 
“usurers, speculators and official and semi-official institutions of credit.” Finally, it 
calls for state control over strategic resources (especially the energy sector), and for 
the confiscation of “lands occupied by U.S. imperialist companies, whatever title 
they may have and to whatever activity they may be dedicated."81 
The Agrarian Program also outlines plans specifically for indigenous 
communities. While these communities would also be provided with land and 
technical assistance, and with all of the above mentioned public services, they would 
be represented by autonomous organizations, “respecting their councils, way of life, 
culture, languages and internal organization.”82 
Also at the 8th National Conference, FARC expanded its political platform by 
issuing the Platform for a Government of National Reconciliation and 
Reconstruction. In it, FARC calls for a number of political changes, including the 
election of the attorney general and Supreme Court, an independent electoral branch, 
a unicameral legislature, guaranteed access of the opposition to communications 
media, and general freedom of the press. FARC also repeated its calls for state 
ownership and administration of the energy industry, communications, public 
services, roads, ports and all natural resources, as well as protectionist policies, 
greater union and academic participation in policy-making, a graduated tax scheme, 
and emphasis on broadening the internal market and self-sufficiency in agriculture 
and industry (“the solidarity economy”). Further, the platform called for greater 
investment and transparency in natural resource extraction, particularly pertaining to 
the Cusiana oilfield. FARC also called for a ten-year moratorium on debt-servicing, 
the cancellation of all military pacts with foreign powers, and the pursuit of 
“equilibrium between society and the natural environment.” Curiously for an 
organization accused of ties to drug trafficking, FARC’s final demand was a solution 
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to the problem of “production, commercialization and consumption of narcotics…a 
grave social problem that cannot be dealt with militarily.”83 
In more recent years, FARC has increasingly used the language of 
Bolivarianism to describe its ideology and platform. Simón Bolívar is now idolized 
by FARC as a national hero and as a symbol of the struggle against American 
imperialism. The use of this term also suggests an ideological affinity with 
Venezuela's late Hugo Chavez.84 
Critics have condemned FARC as a purely criminal organization of 
“dinosaur Marxists with a taste for Rambo-style violence,” that lost sight of its 
“earlier, utopian Socialist objectives”. Even former sympathizers have condemned 
FARC for its military focus.85 Yet, FARC is unapologetic about its methods and 
military success, flatly stating that violence and terror tactics are justified in 
revolution.86  
 
3.3 Post-1990 Growth 
Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, and in the face of increasingly 
brutal counter-insurgency operations, FARC grew dramatically throughout the 
1990s and into the new millennium. In fact, during the 1990s FARC's military 
capacity increased more than it did during the previous thirty years combined.87 
Throughout the 1960s, there were never more than 500 combatants in all of 
Colombia's numerous insurgent groups. Between 1986 and 1995, however, FARC 
grew from 3 600 guerillas fighting on 32 fronts, to 7 000 guerillas fighting on 60 
fronts. By 2000, FARC was estimated to have over 15 000 combatants in its 
ranks.88 By 2002, estimates had risen to 18 000 combatants and were growing.89 
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Other estimates placed the number of leftist guerrillas in Colombia at 22 000 
fighters in 2000.90  
This increase in membership occurred alongside territorial expansion, 
especially into wealthier, more populous regions and along strategically important 
borders with Venezuela, Panama and Ecuador.91 A 1997 study revealed that FARC 
was influential in 622 of 1050 municipalities.92 By 1999, FARC was believed to 
effectively control 60% of Colombian territory.93 Of particular note was the 
“demilitarized zone” encompassing 42 000 square kilometers in Meta and Caqueta 
– an area the size of Switzerland – which was given over to FARC during peace 
negotiations with the Pastrana government.94 The period of FARC control in the 
region was apparently a peaceful one, with observers reporting a reduction in crime 
and an end to paramilitary violence. FARC was also reported to have fired several 
local mayors for corruption.95 In fact, roughly 740 000 Colombians migrated to the 
demilitarized zone before it was re-taken by the Colombian military in 2002.96  
Despite the loss of the DMZ, as recently as 2005 it was estimated that 
FARC maintained a presence in every municipality in Colombia. In some areas, 
FARC has assumed many government powers and responsibilities, including the 
building and staffing of schools and medical facilities, and the administration of ad 
hoc "peoples' courts".97 In Putumayo, for example, FARC “acts like a state and 
fulfills the functions of a government by exercising local power and territorial 
control, regulating the illegal coca market, and enacting laws and norms enforced 
with strict sanctions.”98 In the Baja Bota region of Cauca, for example, where 
FARC has operated for several decades, residents view the local guerrilla 
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commander as the primary authority in the area. FARC frequently holds meetings 
with communities there to discuss local civic matters.99 
In addition to astounding growth in membership and territory, FARC 
exacted a number of political victories in the 1990s. FARC achieved international 
recognition as a principle belligerent in Colombia and insisted on bilateral 
negotiations with the Colombian government, excluding both other guerrilla 
factions and civil society organizations. FARC also succeeded in having client 
politicians elected to mayoral and governors' offices, allowing it to increase the 
financial resources of municipalities under its control, and consolidating and 
legitimizing its role as an "alternative political class." FARC also began holding 
conferences in the jungle with international business leaders, including one in 1999 
with the chair of the New York Stock Exchange.100  
FARC's public relations successes abroad were even more impressive. In 
early 2000, the FARC leadership embarked on an extensive tour of Europe, which 
was so successful that in the following year the European Parliament agreed to 
condemn American counter-insurgency operations against FARC, including Plan 
Colombia. Although a wave of kidnappings eventually soured FARC's European 
relationships, this trip nevertheless presented FARC as a power on par with the 
Colombian government, and was a severe embarrassment to the inept Pastrana 
government.101 
FARC is often labeled a “narco-guerrilla” movement, especially in 
American policy circles. It is similarly described in some academic literature as a 
“quasi-criminal” enterprise dedicated to extracting rents from natural resource 
exports. Often, its success is dismissed as purely a product of increased 
participation in the drug trade. In “The FARC’s Best Friend: US Antidrug Policies 
and the Deepening of Colombia’s Civil War in the 1990s”, Peceny and Durnan 
argue that its narcotics-based income is the single most important factor in 
explaining FARC’s growth in the 1990s. Indeed, structural changes to the cocaine 
industry during the 1990s – including the destruction of the Medellin and Cali 
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cartels (FARC’s most powerful military opponents), and the disruption of 
transnational supply networks – did increasingly drive coca cultivation into FARC-
controlled regions and provide unprecedented opportunities to fund and strengthen 
the insurgency.102 However, they also note that while “this perspective holds a 
kernel of truth”, nevertheless, the political economy literature on “greed-driven 
rebellions,” 
…cannot fully explain the character of the Colombian civil war. It cannot 
identify the origins of an insurgency that has recently celebrated its 40th 
year in existence. Nor can it explain the longstanding ideological vision of 
the FARC or its social base among some sectors of the Colombian rural 
proletariat.103 
 
The post-Cold War era was clearly a time of triumph for FARC. So, what else was 
happening in Colombia that led to this improbable turn of events? Did the 
Colombian people not know that Marxism was supposed to be dead? It is no 
coincidence that this growth in FARC’s membership, territory, military 
effectiveness and political influence corresponded with, first, Colombia's adoption 
of neo-liberal economic policies and, second, political exclusion enforced by state 
violence.  
 
3.4 Neoliberalism 
Unlike much of Latin America, Colombia avoided the debt crisis of the 
1980s and did not liberalize until the following decade. 104  Colombia's first 
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inflation, severe austerity programs were implemented, which included public sector spending cuts 
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significant neo-liberal reforms were implemented in 1990, a moment that has since 
come to be known as la apertura or “the opening”. President César Gaviria 
introduced the reforms quietly over 18 months while the public's attention was 
focused on his flashier political reforms, including attempts to make peace with 
FARC and to rewrite the constitution.105  
Imports were dramatically liberalized, with average import duties falling 
from 40% in 1990 to 12% in 1992, and the number of imports subject to licenses 
reduced from almost 50% to 3%. Colombia's exchange controls – often credited 
with maintaining a stable real exchange rate – were virtually abolished. This 
proved deeply unpopular with both Colombian economists and the general public. 
Labour regulations were also reformed, including a reduction in severance 
payments and elimination of indexation on unemployment subsidies, while salaries, 
benefits and hours worked were made negotiable. Banking reforms were 
introduced, including the reduction of reserve requirements and freeing of most 
interest rates. Controls over foreign direct investment were relaxed, the financial 
sector was deregulated, the insurance industry was liberalized, and the tax system 
was reformed. Many state sectors were privatized.106 
The mass privatization of state corporations – including banks, utilities and 
mining companies – resulted in massive layoffs and forced many workers into the 
informal sector. Between 1992 and 2000, the number of Colombians working in 
the informal economy increased to over 61% of the workforce.107 Simultaneously, 
unionization dramatically declined, especially in the public sector. Between 1991 
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and 2001, over 195 trade unions were dissolved, reducing union membership in 
Colombia by more than 100 000 workers. 108  Colombia now has the lowest 
unionization rate in Latin America, down from 15% in 1990 to less than 5% of the 
total workforce in 2007.109 
Colombia’s all-important oil and mining sectors were also reformed. The 
oil sector was transformed in 2003 to comply with the terms of an IMF loan 
agreement. The practice whereby the state oil company, Ecopetrol, owned 50% of 
all oil produced by foreign companies in Colombia, was eliminated. Additionally, 
the royalty rate multinationals pay on each barrel of oil produced in Colombia was 
reduced from 20% to 8%.110 In 2000, again as part of an IMF loan agreement, 
Colombia privatized the state coal company, Carbocol, selling its 50% share in the 
Cerrejon coal mine111 to a consortium of international mining companies. In 2001, 
Colombia’s mining code was rewritten to, among other things, reduce royalty rates 
on coal from 10-15% to 0.4%.112 In the words of Francisco Ramirez, president of 
the Colombian State Mineworkers’ Union (Sintraminercol): 
With the stroke of a pen, once again the nation lost enormous sums of 
money which could have been used to address social problems, like the fact 
that 80 children in Colombia perish every day from hunger, malnutrition 
and curable diseases.113 
 
Incidentally, Ramirez has, as of 2009, survived no less than seven assassination 
attempts.114 
Colombia’s traditionally stable coffee economy was also devastated by neo-
liberal reforms (in this case, international reforms). In 1989, the United States 
unilaterally dismantled the International Coffee Agreement (ICA), which had long 
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established a price range for coffee that guaranteed growers a minimum return per 
pound. In the absence of the ICA, the global price of coffee would be determined 
by supply and demand, leaving Colombian coffee producers at the mercy of the 
vagaries of the international market. Soon after, the World Bank sponsored a 
development project in Vietnam centered on coffee production. The program was 
so successful that by 2001, Vietnam had surpassed Colombia to become the 
world’s second-largest coffee producer.115 The resulting global surfeit of coffee 
caused the market price to plummet from more than $2 per pound to a mere 58 
cents per pound. As Colombia’s leading (legal) export for much of the 20th century, 
this proved ruinous for Colombian coffee farmers.116 
The virtual collapse of Colombia’s coffee economy also had an unintended 
consequence: Colombian farmers turned en masse to coca production. 117 
Previously, Colombia had been a significant processor and distributor of cocaine, 
but by 1997 Colombia had also become the world’s largest producer of 
unprocessed coca leaf.118 Much of this coca was grown by small farmers in 
marginal regions of the country, particularly the western Amazon. Cocalero 
campesinos (coca producers and harvest workers) did not have a coca tradition 
(unlike some indigenous peoples) but grew the crop “exclusively as a means of 
economic survival in a context of inadequate public services.”119 This reliance on 
coca would prove to have devastating consequences for many rural communities as 
they became targets in the on-going drug war.120 
While some praised Colombia’s neo-liberal reforms (notably, the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), in reality, the reforms 
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aggravated existing poverty and inequality "on the ground" while simultaneously 
failing to accomplish immediate economic goals. For example, despite reducing 
import tariffs and protective structures, imports actually declined during the reform 
period.121 And, by depreciating the real exchange rate, serious instability was 
introduced into the economy. By 1991, speculation had become rampant. The 
reforms also created a large balance of payments surplus and accumulation of 
international reserves, making monetary management exceedingly difficult.122  
Nevertheless, in spite of steadily worsening economic indicators, Gaviria's 
successors carried on his legacy of reform.123 In 2000, Colombia adopted an IMF 
loan and restructuring package that led to drastic cuts in social services.124 
President Alvaro Uribe further extended neo-liberal reforms by, among other 
things, raising the age of retirement by one-third, and cutting the salaries of public 
sector workers by 33%.125 By 2001, Colombia was mired in the most severe 
economic depression in its history, worse even than the Great Depression of the 
1930s.126 Unemployment hovered above 20% while industrial production fell by 
almost 20%. By 2002, about 40% of government revenues were earmarked for debt 
repayment.127 
Although Colombia already had Latin America's third-worst distribution of 
income, the post-Cold War period witnessed further concentration of wealth. 
Colombia's gini coefficient rose from 0.55 in 1991 to 0.59 in 1999.128 In 1990, the 
ratio of income between the poorest 10% and richest 10% of Colombians was 40:1; 
by 2000, the ratio had doubled to 80:1.129 The richest 3% of Colombians now own 
over 70% of the country’s arable land, and 37 individuals own fully half of 
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Colombia's farmland.130 The richest 1% of Colombians control almost half of the 
country's total wealth.131  
The resulting flight of economic refugees from Colombia devastated the 
social fabric of both families and communities. Throughout the reform period, 
Colombians increasingly migrated overseas for work, especially to the United 
States, and Colombian families have become increasingly dependent on 
remittances. In 1999, Colombians received $2.7 billion in remittances from 
relatives working abroad. Within five years, remittances rose to a total of $3.7 
billion, a staggering 220% increase. In 2002, Colombian labour minister Angelino 
Garzon was finally moved to admit that neo-liberal reforms had “contributed to the 
impoverishment of large sectors of the population.”132 
This widespread and growing poverty fuelled FARC recruitment 
throughout the reform period, especially of women members. All FARC recruits, 
male and female, are motivated by economic factors. Women, however, were 
particularly vulnerable to the combination of economic collapse and disappearance 
of social services that characterized the reform period.133 As Mariluz Rubio, a 
human rights ombudsman in San Vicente del Caguan notes, “Young people in rural 
areas have no alternatives. Their families don’t have money for education and there 
are no jobs…And this is still a very macho country. For women, the possibilities 
are even fewer.” 134  In rural communities particularly, many families regard 
educating girls as “a waste of time”. Girls often marry young, and become mothers 
as early as 12 years old.135 In this context, a reduction in public investments and 
collapse of social services means that reforms may negatively impact women and 
girls even more than men and boys. 
Eliana Gonzalez, one of the longest-serving women in FARC, cites poverty 
and a lack of opportunity for her own decision to join the movement. She became a 
guerrilla in 1974 because, in her own words, “I wanted to do something with my 
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life. I wanted things to change.”136 Three decades later, young female members tell 
much the same story. According to one comrade, Sandra, who left school at the age 
of ten to help raise her brothers and sisters, “Lots of women are here because their 
parents beat them, or just to get away from the poverty.” Another young member 
named Ana Maria, speaking to a reporter, said about the rebel life, “It’s tough, but 
at least you don’t have to worry where you’ll get food and clothes from.”137 FARC 
recruitment dramatically increased throughout the reform period. Indeed, between 
1986 and 1995, membership almost doubled, and by 2000 FARC was estimated to 
have over 15 000 combatants in its ranks.138 By 2002, estimates had risen to 18 000 
combatants and were growing.139 
Neo-liberal reforms fuelled widespread dissatisfaction with the institutions 
of Colombian democracy, just as similar reforms did in the rest of Latin America. 
As Duncan Green noted in “A trip to the market: the impact of neo-liberalism in 
Latin America”, 
By 1998, after 16 years of debt crisis, adjustment and undoubted pain, most 
Latin Americans were still waiting for the long-promised benefits of 
structural adjustment to “trickle down” to their neighborhoods. Although 
the rich had had a vintage decade, most of the region’s people were poorer 
and more insecure; their homes, communities, schools and hospitals were 
collapsing around them. Latin America was left trying to find its way in a 
cut-throat global economy, saddled with a population weakened by poverty 
and ignorance. Neoliberals had moderated their tone and now talked more 
about social cost and public spending, but their basic recipe remained 
unchanged as they insisted that the pay-off lay just around the corner. Small 
wonder that so many doubted their good faith and that disillusion with 
politicians of all hues was growing daily.140 
 
The poverty and inequality created by neo-liberal restructuring “disarticulated both 
urban and rural society”, creating a mass of disaffected people who embraced ever 
more radical leftist movements, including guerrilla movements like FARC.141 In 
the words of James Brittain, co-founder of the Atlantic Canada-Colombia Research 
Group, “it must be realized that as long as inequitable sociocultural and political-
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economic conditions pervade Colombian society so too will a base from which the 
FARC-EP can recruit.”142 
However, neo-liberal reforms alone are not enough to explain the 
resurgence of FARC in the 1990s. After all, neo-liberal reforms had been enacted 
across Latin America and were, in many cases, even more severe. The region had 
only mixed results to show for a decade of painful reforms, and even those limited 
gains were achieved only at a profound social cost. According to the UN Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, by 1994, 75 million people 
across Latin America had fallen into poverty.143 Almost half subsisted on incomes 
of less than $1 per day, while wages continued to shrink, the price of staple foods 
rose, and government services deteriorated.144 According to the UN International 
Fund for Agricultural Development, across the continent 40 000 people died from 
chronic hunger every day.145 A further 55 million were malnourished, and deaths 
due to malnutrition had doubled. Outrageously, cholera returned to the continent 60 
years after it had been eradicated.146 Nevertheless, Colombia is the only Latin 
American country with a significant guerrilla presence. 
As Calvert notes, regardless of how miserable and desperate people may be, 
“economic conditions do not specifically require people to join guerrilla 
movements; though they may seem to leave insurgents little choice, in fact it is rare 
for individuals to not have the alternatives of accommodation…”147 Elsewhere in 
Latin America, dissatisfaction with neo-liberal reforms translated into the election 
of leftist governments. In 1990, only two countries in the region governed from the 
left – Cuba and Nicaragua – both of which had assumed power in violent coups. By 
2008, nine Latin American countries – Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, 
Nicaragua, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela – together representing two thirds of the 
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continent’s population, had elected governments from the left.148 Significantly, as 
the left in Latin America grew more and more successful in the political arena, 
armed struggle became more and more a thing of the past. By 2006, FARC (and 
other Colombian guerrilla groups) remained the only leftist movement in the 
hemisphere to insist on the primacy of armed struggle.149 
The triumph of the left in Latin America since the end of the Cold War has 
been nothing short of astonishing. However, this virtual revolution never reached 
Colombia, where right-wing, reactionary governments continue to rule, and the left 
continues to dodge (actual) bullets in the political (and literal) wilderness. Clearly, 
some other factor is at work in the Colombian context. What was happening in 
Colombia that led to a massive resurgence in armed struggle in the post-Cold War 
era that did not occur elsewhere in Latin America? 
 
3.5  Political Exclusion Enforced by Violence 
In addition to neo-liberal economic reforms, FARC's recent growth was 
driven by the exclusion of the left from the political process, often by violent 
means. Colombia's political culture has always been characterized by clientelism, 
corruption and exclusion. Until the mid-1980s, most political offices were 
appointed rather than elected, and the National Front coalition shared all 
government posts equally between the ruling Conservative and Liberal parties on 
an alternating basis.150 Presidents appointed governors, who in turn appointed 
mayors, all according to their ability to generate votes.151 In the words of one 
analyst: 
A key feature of the National Front period was that major producer and 
employer associations, representing dominant and allied class interests, 
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enjoyed privileged access to the policy process while subordinate classes 
(the peasantry, workers and the urban poor) had little or none.152 
 
The National Front coalition ended decades ago, but this process of political 
exclusion endures. Colombia's major parties are still organized according to family, 
kinship and business relationships, most continue to be free of any programmatic 
substance, and votes are often exchanged for state patronage. This closed political 
system concentrates power in the hands of a small, relatively cohesive ruling class. 
Colombian democracy has thus been described as "democracy lite" or 
"exclusionary democracy".153  
The exclusion of outsiders from the political process has been further 
enforced by a series of draconian, anti-democratic laws targeting the poor, civil 
society organizations, human rights campaigners and the political left. In 2002, 
President Uribe declared a state of "internal commotion" that allowed the 
government to prohibit public rallies, impose curfews and conduct searches without 
a court order.154 Uribe also granted judicial police powers to the armed forces, 
attempted to replace local governments with direct military rule, and suggested that 
the government would reform the Constitution, "in particular some of its important 
human rights mechanisms and safeguards."155 
It is, however, the remarkable level of political violence in Colombia that 
contributes most significantly to the Left’s political exclusion. The Colombian 
military has one of the worst human rights records in the world. It employs torture 
routinely, often against civilians. 156  In providing training to the Colombian 
military, the United States has overtly advocated the use of terror tactics against 
civilians, including the use of physical violence, abduction, targeting of family 
members, and use of children as potential information sources.157 According to 
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Amnesty International, “Colombian army personnel trained by US Special Forces 
have been implicated by action or omission in serious human rights violations, 
including the massacre of civilians.”158  
But for all the crimes of the Colombian military, it is closely allied 
paramilitary groups that are responsible for nearly 80% of all recorded human 
rights abuses in Colombia.159 “Paras”, as paramilitaries are known, are private 
security organizations with close ties to the drug trade and the wider business 
community. They are notorious for “widespread, systematic and gross human 
rights violations.”160 It is a poorly kept secret that paramilitaries function as a 
clandestine wing of the army and police, as “soldiers who are not really soldiers but 
more like ghosts flitting between the visible and the invisible, between the regular 
army and the criminal underworld of killers and torturers…”161 By some estimates, 
paramilitary outfits have replaced the police and military as the primary counter-
insurgency force in Colombia.162  
Paramilitaries perform a number of roles and help distance the Colombian 
military from the most ghoulish aspects of the counter-insurgency war against 
FARC. Notoriously, paras impose “law and order” in rural areas (where FARC 
                                                       
158 "Terror Trade Times," Amnesty International Arms and Security Transfers, June 2001 
http://web.amnesty.org/web/ttt.nsf/june2001/colombia.  
159 "Colombia," Human Rights Watch World Report 2001 
www.hrw.org/wr2k1/americas/colombia3.html. 
160 “Terror Trade Times”, Amnesty International. 
161 Taussig, Law in a Lawless Land, xi-xiii, 9-10. 
162 Taussig, Law in a Lawless Land, xi-xiii, 9-10. Paramilitary groups are not necessarily formal, 
organized groups; they may be private security employed by large landowners, or locally raised 
self-defense organizations. Others are large, highly organized, and recognized as “legitimate” by the 
Colombian government. Paramilitaries now reportedly employ more people than the police and 
military combined. Paramilitaries were first organized by landowners and businessmen who 
believed that the military and police were incapable of defending them from guerrillas. Paramilitary 
groups grew dramatically in number and size throughout the 1980s. During this period, drug 
traffickers (especially the infamous Medellin cartel) acquired large tracts of cattle land in FARC-
controlled Magdalena, as well as emerald mines and other investments. Cartels funneled large sums 
of money to paramilitaries to protect their newly acquired property and coca plantations. Their 
intention was to raise an irregular force that could “fight a war of terror so terrible that peasant 
support for the guerrilla would evaporate”. Today, paramilitaries number in the tens of thousands, 
controlling key cities in the northeast and ports along the Pacific coast. They depend on the drug 
trade to finance their operations. See also Peceny and Durnan. “The FARC’s Best Friend”. 
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) is Colombia’s largest paramilitary group. A coalition that 
was forged during the mid-1990s and led by Carlos Castano, it is a well-equipped and trained 
national force that numbers nearly 15 000 soldiers and has a budget in excess of $100 million. 
Approximately 80% of its funds are derived from the cocaine trade. AUC leaders claim that its 
partisans filled one third of the congressional seats contested in 2002. 
 35 
sympathizers are suspected to lurk) through systematic mass assassinations, called 
limpiezas163. A limpieza begins with the arrival in a village of a convoy of SUVs 
carrying uniformed, armed men. The “paras” consult a list of victims, round them 
up, torture and kill them, often with machetes or chainsaws. The bodies are then 
suspended in public view. By 2001, limpiezas had evolved into more lengthy 
affairs, with paras establishing themselves in communities for months or as long as 
a year, conducting assassinations slowly over time and leaving villagers to watch 
with bated breath, wondering who would be next. Over 90 limpiezas were reported 
in 2001 alone. 164  Such widespread paramilitary violence helps account for 
Colombia’s extraordinarily high number of internal refugees.165 
Since the early 1990s, paramilitary violence in Colombia has dramatically 
increased. The victims are primarily trade unionists, journalists, teachers, human 
rights workers and the poor.166 Between 1999 and 2003, over 4000 civilians in 
Colombia were killed for political motives.167 In 2002 alone, 178 trade unionists in 
Colombia were killed.168 According to the Washington Office on Latin America 
(WOLA), "Colombia remains one of the most dangerous places in the world to be a 
governor, a journalist, a labor leader, a mayor, or a human rights defender."169 
Both the Colombian government and military maintain close ties to 
paramilitary groups.170 According to Amnesty International, “there is conclusive 
evidence that paramilitary groups continue to operate with the tacit or active 
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support of the Colombian armed forces.”171 For example, the Colombian military 
helps facilitate limpiezas by providing paramilitaries with safe passage to and from 
targeted villages, and by sealing-off those areas by conducting mock military 
exercises.172 Alirio Uribe, one of Colombia’s leading human rights lawyers and a 
member of the José Alvear Restrepo Lawyers’ Collective, describes the paras’ 
relationship with the government as extraordinarily close: 
Historically, the paramilitaries represented the privatization of the dirty 
war…the State could say that it has nothing to do with it because the 
paramilitaries are responsible. But the paramilitaries have never been 
independent from the state.173 
 
Former president Uribe himself is believed to have close ties with the paramilitary 
outfit United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC) that go back to his time as a 
young politician in Medellín.174 Practically speaking, it is virtually impossible to 
separate the paramilitaries from the state. 
What makes this state-sanctioned violence significant to the discussion at 
hand is not that it is so ubiquitous or that it is so extreme, but that it is used to 
exclude the political left and other marginalized groups from the political process. 
Political exclusion is its purpose and the political left is its target. It is not FARC or 
other leftist guerrillas – the stated enemy – that have been most affected by state 
violence. Rather, it is the poor, civil society organizations, trade unions, human 
rights defenders and other vulnerable groups – broadly speaking, the political left. 
Nor is this the inevitable result of vulnerable civilians being caught between the 
guerrilla and the state, a mere case of collateral damage. Rather, these groups have 
been deliberately targeted for their real or supposed political leanings. Any serious 
examination of the counter-insurgency war makes this clear. 
Training manuals used by the US Army, Special Forces, Central 
Intelligence Agency and other institutions to train Colombian military officers (at, 
for example, the School of the Americas) characterize civil society as inherently 
subversive, and portray civil society organizations as FARC sympathizers. They 
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define as "subversive" any organizations that encourage "immediate social, 
political, or economic reform." 175  According to these documents, a guerrilla 
presence may be indicated by such innocent acts as: 
Refusal of peasants to pay rent, taxes or loan payments… Characterization 
of the armed forces as the enemy of the people… Appearance of many new 
members in established organizations such as labor 
organizations…Initiation of letter writing campaigns to newspapers and 
government officials deploring undesirable conditions and blaming 
individuals in power.176 
 
As Doug Stokes notes in America’s Other War: Terrorizing Colombia, “activities 
considered indications of subversion were actually practices otherwise considered 
normal elements of the democratic process within liberal democracies.” 177 
Nevertheless, the Colombian military makes a practice of deliberately targeting 
civil society groups that engage in them.178  
Labour movements are considered inherently subversive, and the military 
has been used to contain union activism. In 1990, when negotiations between the 
Cerrejon mine and the Colombian mineworkers’ union failed, 800 armed soldiers 
and a tank unit occupied the mine and forced the strikers to return to work.179 
Paramilitary violence has also been used to exclude leftist parties, including the ill-
fated UP party, from the electoral process. In 1990, UP presidential candidate 
Bernardo Jaramillo was assassinated and was never replaced owing to security 
concerns. Thousands of UP members were killed and “disappeared” throughout the 
following decade. Unsurprisingly, the party fractured, losing two-thirds of its 
national council members to resignations before losing legal recognition as a party 
in 2002. In 1996, members of the leftist parties PRT, EPL and CRS in Sucre were 
killed. In 1997, all of PRT’s candidates in local and provincial elections were 
murdered and not replaced. That same year, CRS withdrew candidates from races 
in three provinces due to death threats and killings.180 
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Associating rather benign non-violent and democratic political and labour 
activism with guerrilla activity has made participation in the democratic process 
inherently dangerous for anyone on the left. Anyone critical of the Colombian 
government is liable to be labeled an “enemy” and targeted as part of the counter-
insurgency war. In this climate of extreme state violence, there remains virtually no 
room for non-violent political protest, dissent or opposition. In 2005, much of the 
“legal” left in Colombia united to form the Polo Democrático Alternativo (PDA), 
which won 4 representative seats, 11 senate seats and 10% of the vote in the 2006 
legislative elections. The PDA presidential candidate, Carlos Gaviria, came second 
in the presidential race with over 22% of the national vote, a historic high for the 
left in Colombia. In an ugly case of history repeating itself, however, the leadership 
received death threats and PDA members were assassinated.181 Surely, the very real 
risk of death that attends participation in the electoral process helps explain the lack 
of a robust political left in Colombia. 
The left in Colombia remains extremely weak, and Colombia has yet to 
elect a leftist government since the end of the Cold War. Some, including Wilson 
and Carroll in “The Colombian Contradiction”, attribute this phenomenon to the 
persistence of armed conflict and guerrilla forces:  
The guerrilla’s strong presence fueled many upper- and middle-class 
Colombians’ fears and has allowed the ‘guerrilla terrorist’ label to be 
applied freely to leftist political parties building support for right-wing 
solutions…in other South American countries…the lack of threat from 
insurgencies…facilitated peaceful reform.182 
 
Indeed, the press routinely labels members of the PDA as “camouflaged 
communists”, “guerrilla terrorists” and “guerrilla auxiliaries”. Further, the most 
successful leftist parties in Colombia count the fewest former guerrillas among 
their members.183 And yet, this argument would be more convincing were it not for 
the shocking amount of state violence directed at the whole of the political left in 
Colombia, not just former guerrillas. Such extreme state violence seems to suggest 
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that there is more to the left’s electoral failures than the distaste or fears of the 
middle class. 
Political violence was particularly alarming during the presidency of Alvaro 
Uribe, from 2002 to 2010. As Amnesty International highlighted in a 2003 report, 
Under the [Uribe] government, human rights activists were killed, 
"disappeared", detained, threatened and harassed. While expressing an 
interest in maintaining dialogue with non-governmental organizations, in 
practice officials and some sectors of the media frequently treated human 
rights defenders as subversives, targeting them during intelligence and 
counter-insurgency operations.184 
 
In 2003, eighty Colombian NGOs issued a joint report condemning the dramatic 
increase in extrajudicial executions, disappearances, torture and arbitrary 
detentions during his tenure. Importantly, the report asserted that “indiscriminate 
military operations” had been carried out for the purpose of “social control and to 
implant terror in the population.”185  
 Any examination of state violence in Colombia would not be complete 
without a discussion of aerial coca fumigation. It is an excellent illustration of how 
growing poverty and inequality, in combination with state violence, directly 
impacted the growth of FARC in the post-Cold War era. Aerial fumigation – 
whereby large swathes of rainforest and farmland are aerially sprayed with a 
combination of glyphosate and other chemicals – was adopted to combat coca 
cultivation.186 Under pressure from the United States, the Colombian government 
dramatically expanded the aerial fumigation program in the 1990s. More fields 
were fumigated in 1994 than in the previous four years combined. In 1995, almost 
25 000 hectares of coca, or roughly one third of the national crop, was 
eradicated.187 By 2006, aerial fumigation had increased a further forty times 
over.188 
While the practice may seem innocuous, it is not. Glyphosate is a toxic 
herbicide, and residents in the spray zones report being frequently exposed to the 
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spray mixture. They complain of adverse health effects, which were confirmed by 
emergency health services and clinics in the spray zones. Concerns have also been 
raised about the impact of spraying on the tropical ecosystems of Amazonia. Health 
and environmental concerns have been dismissed or downplayed by the 
government, which insists that the spray mixture is relatively benign. However, 
there was little environmental regulation, protection or oversight of fumigation in 
the program’s early years, and no rigorous health monitoring or studies of the 
impacts of spraying have been conducted.189  
Additionally, aerial fumigation threatens the livelihoods of rural 
Colombians. Coca cultivation increased dramatically in the 1990s, due in no small 
part to neoliberal economic reforms (as we have seen). By the mid-1990s, hundreds 
of thousands of Colombian peasants had become coca growers or were otherwise 
employed in the industry. In addition to destroying the illicit coca crops that 
growers relied on to earn a living, aerial spraying proved to be rather indiscriminate 
and often ruined legal crops as well.190 Destruction of export cash crops, as well as 
staple and subsistence food crops, resulted in widespread hunger.191 According to 
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, fumigation forced the mass 
displacement of Colombians from coca-growing areas.192 In a very real sense, 
aerial coca fumigation is a form of both physical and economic violence. 
It is no surprise, then, that coca fumigation proved to be exceedingly 
unpopular among rural Colombians. In 1996, for example, more than 200 000 
campesino cocaleros in Putumayo, Caquetá, Guaviare and Cauca marched to the 
department capitals to protest the program. The protests included women and 
children, but nevertheless were often met with violent repression.193  
FARC activity increased over the same period and many observers agree 
that coca eradication was at least partly responsible.194 One department-level 
analysis of the relationship between coca production and violence in Colombia 
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found that, contrary to conventional wisdom, escalated guerrilla activity did not 
correlate with coca production but, rather, showed a “significant and positive” 
relationship with coca eradication.195 By first threatening campesino’s livelihoods 
with fumigation, and then responding to the resulting public outcry with violence, 
the Colombian government generated support for FARC in rural communities. 
According to Peter Calvert: 
…neither the FARC nor the ELN have any difficulty recruiting supporters. 
The main reason is the US-sponsored coca-eradication programme, which 
is deeply unpopular among the Colombian peasantry and which has 
generated all-out resistance…196 
 
Another observer noted that campesinos, “view the guerrillas as the only response 
to the attack on their lives and livelihood through aerial fumigation of coca and 
poppy fields…”197 One author researching the cocalero movement found that 
FARC and other guerrillas have been embraced by Colombia’s rural poor,  
…due to their support for longstanding but unfulfilled demands on the state 
for protection, land, credit, access to markets, and social services. FARC 
displayed impressive local power and authority, maintaining order in 
Putumayo and other parts of the Amazon by enacting laws and norms 
backed up by strict sanctions.198 
 
In the words of one campesino in Western Amazonia, 
After the [paramilitaries], FARC arrived and imposed order. They got it 
right, I mean everything. No more payment in bazuco, no more gun thugs, 
no more [paras] stealing chickens. Now you can go to your fields or 
wherever and nobody will steal anything. They’ve been struggling with this 
for a whole year. Everyone here has adjusted to this new situation and 
we’ve been very happy, very content. The guerrillas are real men.199 
 
Of course, not all rural Colombians dissatisfied with aerial fumigation have, or 
will, turn to FARC for justice. Indeed, some of FARC’s other activities (including 
attempts to suppress civil society groups) have alienated many potential supporters. 
Nevertheless, FARC’s membership continued to grow throughout western 
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Amazonia during times of intense aerial spraying.200 It seems clear that, as the 
fumigation saga illustrates, a combination of growing poverty and state violence 
has a direct, positive relationship to FARC’s recruiting success and growing public 
support.  
Plan Patriota, a counter-insurgency operation launched in 2004, is another 
illustration of how increasing state violence has promoted FARC's recent growth. 
Under Plan Patriota, the Colombian military, in cooperation with American and 
private sector combat forces, targeted civilians with a "scorched-earth campaign" to 
undermine FARC's support base in rural areas (a strategy called “draining the 
sea”). The campaign was concentrated in the southern departments of Putumayo, 
Caquetá, Nariño and Meta. Civilians in these areas reported that Colombian forces 
led violent attacks against unarmed civilians. These orders were apparently issued 
from as high on the chain of command as General Reinaldo Castellanos. That the 
civilian population, rather than the guerillas themselves, were the intended target of 
these attacks was made clear by the former general of US Southern Command, 
James Hill, who admitted that the campaign targeted “suspected rebel-extended 
regions” and “rural areas where local peasant farmers support the FARC.”201 
While official reports touted the success of Plan Patriota and the imminent 
demise of FARC, these abuses against the peasantry served only to increase 
support for FARC. Over the course of that year, FARC dramatically expanded its 
combat forces. In December 2004 alone, FARC recruited one hundred members in 
a single municipality. In early 2005, FARC launched a counter-offensive at a major 
military installation described as "the worst two-day period for the armed forces 
since President Uribe took office." Smaller tactical operations followed, with the 
FARC's Eastern Block alone averaging one major attack per day and exacting over 
450 enemy casualties in a single month. While Plan Patriota succeeded in forcing 
FARC into a temporary tactical withdrawal, FARC emerged from the operation 
with greater civilian support and greater numbers.202 
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Subsequently, in 2005, FARC shifted decisively from its traditional tactic 
of small-scale, intermittent assaults to large-scale and continuous direct 
confrontation with Colombian state forces. FARC since carried out a number of 
spectacular and successful attacks on corporate and state infrastructure, eliminating 
entire military battalions in the process. In 2007, guerrillas bombed an oil pipeline 
in Arauca (owned by Los Angeles-based Occidental Petroleum) a record 170 times, 
shutting it down for 240 days and costing the company $100 million in lost 
earnings.203 In the first week of May 2008, FARC carried out a coordinated series 
of attacks that isolated Colombia's largest oil pipeline and halted production of up 
to three million barrels of oil. Simultaneously, a second front in Norte de Santander 
seized the Cano-Limon pipeline. In response, General Paulino Coronado 
coordinated an offensive to free the pipeline and resume oil production, but FARC 
quickly eliminated the deployed battalion and continued the assault for several 
more days. One month later, FARC targeted a coal supply train, derailing about 40 
wagons carrying over 100 tons of coal. While officials tried to downplay the 
seriousness of the damage, international wire services reported that the assault 
considerably hampered trade by destabilizing entire export routes. That same year, 
FARC celebrated its 44th anniversary by assaulting the Cerrejón coal mine.204 
 
3.6 Neo-liberal Reform and State Violence in Partnership 
It should be recognized that neo-liberal reform and escalating state violence 
are not independent phenomena. Rather, state violence is intimately tied to the 
protection and promotion of neo-liberal reforms in Colombia. It is no coincidence 
that political violence peaked at a time when the impacts of neo-liberal reforms 
were also deepening. Indeed, the purpose of state violence – like the stepped-up 
“social control” so characteristic of the Uribe administration – is, in essence, to 
overcome democratic objections to unpopular neo-liberal reforms through the use 
of coercive force. 
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In 1999 the United States tripled military aid to Colombia under the 
auspices of various counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency programs.205 Despite 
the cover of the ongoing drug war and, later, the War on Terror206, it “became 
apparent that the U.S. government intended to use its war on drugs as a conduit for 
militarily implementing neo-liberalism in Colombia.”207 Then U.S. Secretary of 
Energy Bill Richardson confirmed as much when he said, “the United States and its 
allies will invest millions of dollars in two areas of the Colombian economy, in the 
areas of mining and energy, and to secure these investments we are tripling military 
aid to Colombia.”[emphasis mine]208 
The relationship between neo-liberalism and state violence is evident in the 
fact that state violence is disproportionately common in mining areas and oil-rich 
regions of the country. Plan Colombia, an American counter-narcotics operation, 
focused on the oil-rich department of Putumayo. During the Bush Administration, 
operations conducted under the guise of the War on Terror focused on the oil-rich 
department of Arauca. In both cases, the operational objective was to protect 
foreign companies that had invested in Colombia in the wake of recent neo-liberal 
reforms. Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Javier Cruz, who commanded troops in 
Putumayo, made this clear when he said in 2004, “Security is the most important 
thing to me. Oil companies need to work without worrying and international 
investors need to feel calm.”209 Violence in these regions is staggering. Between 
1995 and 2002, 433 massacres were reported in mining municipalities in Colombia. 
In combination with individual assassinations, they resulted in over 6600 deaths. 
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Indeed, almost 70% of Colombia’s displaced persons have been displaced from 
mining regions.210 
 
3.7 Conclusions and Prospects for the Future 
Both anti-democratic laws and extreme violence meted out by the state have 
excluded the left from the political process both locally and at the national level, 
where it has been unable to elect a critical mass of representatives.211 This is in 
stark contrast to much of Latin America, where popular dissatisfaction with neo-
liberal reforms has propelled the rise of leftist governments and the left has come to 
dominate the political scene in the post-Cold War era. Jorge Castañeda, author of 
the seminal work Utopia Unarmed, and widely considered the foremost analyst of 
the Latin American left, recently noted that:  
The combination of secular poverty and inequality and full-fledged 
representative democracy would inevitably bring to power governments 
seeking to govern on behalf of the poor and dispossessed…Under 
conditions of democracy, the left thrived electorally, winning or showing 
with remarkable consistency and simultaneity…The convergence of 
democracy and inequality was unbeatable, as it had been in Western Europe 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century: the left won more and 
more frequently.212 
 
Surely it is fair to conclude that in Colombia it is a lack of genuine democracy – 
that is, the political exclusion of the left and marginalized groups, often through 
violent means – in combination with popular dissatisfaction with neo-liberal 
reforms, which lead to FARC’s remarkable growth in the post-Cold War era. 
Sorely pressed by an untenable economic reality, and without legitimate means of 
participating in their own governance, many Colombians turned to the only other 
available option: armed struggle. 
Reports of the decline and imminent defeat of FARC are not new. As early 
as 1973, when the joint American-Colombian campaign Operation Anori destroyed 
much of FARC's leadership and left as few as 150 guerillas in the field, the 
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Colombian government was quick to pronounce FARC dead. Of course, the 
declaration of victory was premature and FARC rebounded in a few years. 
Between 1998 and 2006, despite numerous counter-insurgency campaigns backed 
by aggressive cheerleading in the media, victory over FARC was never realized. 
Far from declining, during this period FARC experienced a significant increase in 
membership and in military capability. A series of high-profile attacks eventually 
silenced both American and Colombian officials. In 2008, Interior Minister Carlos 
Holguin was finally moved to say, "Colombia should not dream or come close to 
proclaiming a victory."213 
FARC suffered two significant set-backs in spring 2008. Commander-in-
Chief Marulanda died, and two of FARC’s highest-ranking, most recognizable 
leaders, Commandante Raúl Reyes and Iván Ríos, were killed. Again, the 
Colombian media was quick to suggest that a combination of desertion, military 
defeats and infiltrators could destroy a group "once thought invincible". Even Hugo 
Chávez opined that the era of guerrilla warfare had passed.214 However, the Uribe 
Administration was found to have actively under-represented statistics and 
information related to the war and security. Official estimates wildly diverge from 
the estimates of scholars and military analysts. The former director of Colombia's 
National Administrative Department of Statistics, Cesar Caballeros, admitted that 
the government had manipulated statistics "to make Colombia appear safer than it 
is, casting doubt on achievements that have made [Uribe] popular both at home and 
with the U.S. government." In this context, one can be doubly certain that reports 
of FARC's supposed disintegration are suspect.215 The Colombian military now 
claims that, as of 2014, FARC fields only about 8 000 fighters, down from a high 
of 16 000 in 2001.216  
FARC is now engaged in peace talks with the Colombian government. 
Informal discussions with President Juan Manuel Santos began shortly after he 
took office in August 2010, followed by exploratory talks in Havana and formal 
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negotiations in Oslo in 2012. The six-point agenda includes land reform, political 
participation, drug trafficking, victims’ rights, disarmament and implementation of 
the peace deal. However, the agreement to negotiate does not include a ceasefire. 
Military operations are expected to continue until a final deal is reached. President 
Santos had hoped for a significant agreement by late 2013, but has now revised his 
timetable, hoping for some progress by the end of 2014.217  
The Colombian public widely supports the peace process and is optimistic 
about the outcome. Santos’ re-election in 2014 was regarded as a successful 
referendum on the peace-process. However, negotiations have proceeded much 
more slowly than originally envisioned. And, while key agreements have been 
reached on land reform, the agenda is notably more modest than in previous peace 
talks, lacking the radical changes to Colombia’s political and economic model that 
FARC has long argued for.218 Further, Santos was defense minister in former 
President Uribe’s administration, overseeing some of Colombia’s worst human 
rights scandals, and leads a centre-right coalition (his chief political rival, Óscar 
Iván Zuluaga, is a hard right militarist candidate backed by Uribe). Human rights 
activists continue to be murdered and jailed in startling numbers, and according to 
Amnesty International, “human rights violations and abuses continue unabated.”219 
In the absence a radical political and economic transformation, whatever 
agreements are reached may prove inadequate to mollify FARC supporters. And, if 
the past repeats itself and negotiations are interrupted by violent reprisals, the peace 
talks may prove short-lived. 
FARC has proven remarkably resilient in its four decades of existence. As 
long as it remains one of the few credible alternatives to Colombia's ruling elite, 
and the Colombian government fails to adequately address the poverty and 
violence that motivate FARC supporters and recruits, FARC may continue to 
survive and thrive in the era of neo-liberal globalization. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE NAXALITE-MAOIST INSURGENCY 
 
4.1 History Until 1990 
The Indian subcontinent is vast, its peoples linguistically, religiously and 
culturally diverse. The Mughal Empire, which ruled over most of what we now call 
India from the mid-sixteenth to the early seventeenth century, was the first power 
to achieve anything resembling unified political control over the region. As a small 
and less-than-united ruling elite in an alien land, the Mughals were forced to 
develop a strong, complex bureaucracy to rule effectively. The Mughal Empire 
declined in the eighteenth century and was supplanted by the British Empire, which 
rose to supreme power in the region between 1740 and 1860. The British closely 
imitated the Mughals’ governance strategies, and moved to standardize law and 
policy and develop a nation-wide economic strategy. British rule quashed old 
regional conflicts but also brought an end to local political and economic evolution 
by upholding imperial forms of rule.220 
In the twentieth century, the colonial regime introduced new laws and 
market rationales, and a modern bureaucracy and infrastructure. India also 
experienced a burgeoning of public institutions as well as organized mass struggles 
for social, political and economic rights. Independence from colonial rule was 
achieved in 1947, swiftly followed by the partitioning of the subcontinent 
(including, most dramatically and violently, the secession of Pakistan). This 
triumph was tempered, however, by a number of challenges. The new national 
government had inherited a society deeply divided along ethnic, religious, cultural, 
linguistic and caste lines, and soon found itself struggling to confront widespread 
poverty and deeply-rooted inequalities.221 
India’s early nationalist campaigners believed that poverty was inextricably 
linked to the siphoning of economic resources to Europe during the colonial period, 
a process that amounted to a continual, exhausting drain on the Indian economy. As 
a result, the national leadership was deeply suspicious of laissez-faire economics 
and free trade. Indeed, India’s first prime minister and icon of the independence 
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movement, Jawaharlal Nehru, regarded international trade as a “whirlpool of 
economic imperialism”.222 India thus turned inward after 1947, pursuing a policy of 
economic self-sufficiency and state-driven development called Nehruvian 
socialism. Led by the National Planning Commission, the early years of the post-
independence period saw marked economic improvement, including a 50% 
expansion of industry by 1959, and large increases in agricultural output.223 
However, education, communication and electrical infrastructure did not improve 
sufficiently to meet the needs of India’s growing population, especially in rural 
areas.224 Nehru’s performance in office received mixed reviews at best. 
The Naxalite movement was born in the chaos of a country-wide agrarian 
crisis in 1967. While an unforeseen drought was officially blamed, the crisis was in 
fact the poisoned fruit of both India's prevailing feudal system of land tenure and 
the government’s failure to successfully address rural poverty.225 In 1967, much of 
India’s cultivated land was held by a small, wealthy minority in the form of large 
estates. Only 5% of rural households owned a total of 40% of India's cultivated 
land, while almost 58% of rural households collectively owned or leased only 7% 
of total cultivated land.226 Peasants were largely subsistence producers who could 
not generate marketable surplus. Large landowners often took advantage of general 
food scarcity to hoard their own surplus produce and sell it at inflated prices.227  
 The Indian government attempted to address this situation with a series of 
land and tenancy reforms, which failed spectacularly. First, the government 
attempted to abolish the zamindari regime, a Mughal-era system of land ownership 
that, among other things, allowed landlords to collect taxes from their tenants on 
behalf of the state. However, many large landowners were influential in the ruling 
Congress Party and in state governments, enabling them to de-claw the legislation 
to such an extent that zamindars retained most of their lands and privileges. The 
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only significant achievement was the abolishment of zamindars’ ability to collect 
tax. Even this victory proved hollow since, in return for surrendering this privilege, 
zamindars received over Rs. 2 billion in compensation.228 
 The government also tried to enforce ceilings on the size of individual 
landholdings, with the goal of redistributing surplus land. However, the ceilings 
were kept relatively high, and the delay between the announcement of the reforms 
and their implementation allowed landlords to transfer land in excess of the 
proposed ceiling to relatives, effectively retaining the land for themselves. 
Ultimately, the surplus land accrued to the government was inconsequential. In the 
state of Andhra Pradesh, for example, the government expected to gain almost 75 
000 acres, but was only able to acquire a laughable 191 acres total.229 Tenancy 
reforms that aimed to regulate rents and provide tenants with some security also 
failed. Again, the long delay between announcement and implementation allowed 
landlords to preemptively evict their tenants en masse.230 
The government also attempted to alleviate chronic food insecurity by 
introducing the New Agrarian Strategy in 1960. Better known as the “green 
revolution”, this program amounted to an aggressive shift towards modern 
industrial agriculture through a package of new equipment and inputs, including 
hybrid seeds, pesticides and fertilizers. The government subsidized these inputs and 
extended inexpensive credit to farmers for investment in tractors, threshers and 
other machinery, and also invested heavily in dams, irrigation and other 
infrastructure.231 Green revolution techniques and technologies were intended to 
improve production, but, once again, proved to do more harm than good. What 
gains were made in food grain output began to slow, owing to the fact that green 
revolution technologies obtained decreased returns over time, did not yield as well 
in less fertile regions, encouraged soil erosion and decreased groundwater levels. 
Simultaneously, chemical inputs, machinery and irrigation demanded continued 
costly investment. Comparatively large landholders profited, creating a new class 
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of affluent “capitalist farmers” 232 , but small farmers were left with higher 
production costs, higher rents, and little improvement in real income. 
Mechanization on large farms also increased unemployment by displacing farm 
labourers. While the income of large landowners rose during this period, income 
and food security among small farmers and landless labourers actually declined.233  
Facing rising costs and unable to earn sufficient income, many were forced 
to borrow money, but a bad credit market compounded their financial difficulties. 
Government agencies, cooperatives and banks provided only 7% of available credit 
in the rural market.234 Private agencies and village moneylenders supplied the rest 
and often charged usurious interest rates of up to 50% per annum.235 As a result, 
the rural workforce became massively indebted. By 1967, over 60% of labourer 
households in India were indebted.236 Many were unable to pay their quickly 
escalating debts, forcing them to mortgage or sell their land. Others entered into a 
form of bonded slavery to their creditors.237  
Thus, a vast population of landed peasants was transformed into a vast 
population of tenants and landless labourers. Between 1951 and 1971, the number 
of landless laborers in India rose from 31 million to 45 million.238 Tenants’ lives 
were extremely precarious since their rights were not defined under law and their 
rents could be as high as 80% of their crop.239 Landless laborers, meanwhile, 
earned extremely low wages and endured chronic underemployment (some might 
work only three months per year).240  
By 1967, in spite of land reforms and agricultural modernization, rural India 
was blighted by extreme and worsening poverty. Employment opportunities were 
disappearing even as millions were driven from the land by a rising tide of debt.241 
Chronic food and employment insecurity left India especially vulnerable to an 
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unexpected drought that year. Beginning in 1966, newspaper reports began to 
chronicle the horrors of steadily worsening malnutrition and starvation across 
India. According to government reports that year, almost 47 million people across 
117 districts were affected by “scarcity conditions.”242 By 1967, India faced a food 
shortage of 10 million tones.243 One third of Bihar State was declared a famine 
area, the first ever declaration of famine since the end of colonial rule. Food riots 
broke out across the country.244  
Enter the uprising at Naxalbari. The principle ideologue of the uprising was 
Charu Mazumdar, a disaffected member of the Communist Party of India 
(Marxist), or CPI(M), working from Siliguri, West Bengal. Mazumdar accused 
CPI(M) of “betraying the cause of Indian revolution by choosing the path of 
parliamentarism and class collaboration.”245 Mazumdar favored the principle of 
armed struggle. In his own words, “he who has not dipped his hand in the blood of 
class enemies can hardly be called a communist.”246 He advocated the “Chinese 
model” developed by Chairman Mao (which involved arming the peasantry, 
establishing a base of support in the countryside, persisting in protracted armed 
struggle, and finally encircling and capturing cities).247 Mazumdar's views quickly 
gained influence among the rural poor. By 1962, peasants across West Bengal were 
arming themselves. By 1967, Mazumdar and his followers were openly agitating 
against the ruling United Front government.248 
Also that year, Kanu Sanyal, a member of CPI(M), and Jangal Santhal, a 
local tribal leader, held a peasants' conference in Darjeeling, West Bengal, where 
they called on the population to prepare for protracted armed resistance. Within 
months, 20 000 peasants across the state were enrolled in the party as full time 
activists. 249  Armed “peasants' committees” seized landholdings, murdered 
landlords and looted their guns, destroyed land records, cancelled debts, and 
                                                       
242 Banerjee, India's Simmering Revolution, 1-3. 
243 Banerjee, India's Simmering Revolution, 1-3.  
244 Banerjee, India's Simmering Revolution, 1-3. 
245 Venkitesh Ramakrishnan, “The Road from Naxalbari,” Frontline vol. 22 i. 21: 8-21. 
246 William Thornton and Songok Han Thornton, "India in Search of Itself: The Crisis and 
Opportunity of Indo-Globalization, New Political Science 31 (2009): 183. 
247 Ramakrishnan, “The Road from Naxalbari”, 8-21. 
248 Banerjee, India's Simmering Revolution, 72-87. 
249 Banerjee, India's Simmering Revolution, 84-87.  
 53 
established parallel village governments. By May, a network of peasant committees 
held strongholds throughout Darjeeling district, including in Naxalbari, Kharibari 
and Phansidewa.250 
After a policeman was killed in Naxalbari and police retaliated by firing on 
a crowd of villagers (killing nine women and children) violence in the region 
quickly escalated into open rebellion. Armed bands roamed the countryside 
collecting taxes and dispensing justice, and numerous murders and abductions were 
reported. The situation degenerated into what the West Bengal Chief Minister 
called a "reign of terror."251 The rebellion came to an end in July when Jangal 
Santhal and several other leaders were arrested.252  
Although the Naxalbari uprising lasted only a few months, it had far-
reaching consequences for rural India and was a watershed moment for India's 
communist movement. While the CPI(M) leadership officially condemned the 
rebels, dissenters within the party demonstrated their support for the uprising, 
especially in the regions of West Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil 
Nadu, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir. The dissenters held a 
meeting several months after the uprising and established the All India 
Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR). In May 1969, 
soon after the release of Kanu Sanyal, Jangal Santhal and other leaders of the 
rebellion, AICCCR separated from CPI(M), officially establishing the Communist 
Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), or CPI(M-L). At its first congress in 1970, 
Mazumdar was elected General Secretary.253 
Despite widespread and severe police repression, CPI(M-L) cadres were 
able to establish a foothold in remote regions with the help of dalit (untouchable) 
and adivasi (tribal) villagers. First in the Srikakulam district of Andhra Pradesh, 
then in the Telengana region of Andhra Pradesh, and the Bhojpur district of Bihar, 
the “Naxalite” militants began to establish parallel administrative bodies in the 
villages and assumed many government responsibilities.254 During this period, 
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Mazumdar acquired something of a cult status within the party, such that his arrest 
and subsequent death in police detention in July 1972 led to a virtual collapse of 
central authority in CPI(M-L).255 
 The next several decades were characterized by a number of schisms in the 
“Naxalite” movement, all driven by conflicting interpretations of the Maoist 
revolutionary line.256 At one point there were as many as two-dozen Marxist 
guerrilla outfits operating in India, “all claiming to be the real inheritors of the 
legacy of Naxalbari.”257 If any such group could be called CPI(M-L)'s immediate 
successor, it was probably the People's War Group (PWG).258 PWG was founded 
by Kondapalli Seetharamaiah, a former teacher and state committee member of 
CPI(M-L).259 
PWG focused its efforts on establishing a base in Chhattisgarh, Andhra 
Pradesh, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh.260 The Bastar district of Chhattisgarh, just 
north of Warangal, soon became the epicenter of the movement and proved to be 
an ideal base due to the thick jungle cover.261 PWG went on to gain control of 15 
000 square kilometres in Andhra Pradesh where it forcibly redistributed large 
amounts of land, a move backed by significant popular support. In some areas, 
including Warangal, PWG established a parallel government, held its own 
“peoples’ courts”, and collected taxes from local businesses and forest 
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contractors.262 Seetharamaiah was replaced as General Secretary of the party by his 
close associate, alias Ganapathi, in 1991.263 
Still, the Naxalite movement remained fragmented. Since its inception in 
1980, PWG had tried to bring all other Naxalite outfits under its umbrella. As early 
as 1981, Seetharamaiah met with Kanai Chatterjee, his opposite number in the 
major splinter group Maoist Communist Centre (MCC), to discuss the possibility 
of a merger. However, differences over tactics and strategy, personality clashes, 
and a turf war over territory prevented talks from moving forward.264 As late as 
1998, armed clashes were still erupting between PWG and MCC. The guerrillas 
refer to this period as their “black chapter.”265  
In 2000, however, hostility between different Naxalite factions declined. 
That year, MCC declared a unilateral ceasefire that was reciprocated by PWG. 
Merger talks were reopened and both groups jointly drafted a number of policy 
documents. The merger was officially announced on 14 October 2004 at a news 
conference in Hyderabad by PWG’s Andhra Pradesh State Secretary alias 
Ramakrishna. The new party was christened the Communist Party of India-Maoist 
(CPI-Maoist). PWG and MCC’s armed wings – the People’s Guerrilla Army and 
People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army, respectively – also merged at this time. They 
now operate jointly as the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA).266 The 
merger was less the product of a desire within the movement for unity than it was 
of new external pressures that forced the movement to consolidate to survive. As 
one commentator noted, “only the social ravages of globalization could have 
brought about this remarkable merger.”267  The merger not only allowed the 
movement to survive, but also gave the insurgency new teeth. Indeed, the Maoists’ 
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recent successes compelled Prime Minister Singh to brand them India’s “biggest 
internal security threat.”268 
The economic and political conditions which led to the Naxalite rebellion in 
the 1960s – poverty and political exclusion enforced by violence – would also lead to 
dramatic growth in the Maoist insurgency in the post-Cold War era.  
 
4.2 Organization 
The Naxalite-Maoist insurgency has a well-developed organizational 
structure. The armed wing of the movement is organized into central, state and 
zonal commissions.269 The lowest level of the hierarchy is the village-level militia, 
composed of new recruits. They are tasked with patrolling and protecting a handful 
of villages, as well as assisting villagers in day-to-day tasks such as laboring in the 
fields, repairing houses and digging wells.270 The highest level of the hierarchy is 
the People’s Liberation Guerilla Army (PLGA), the Maoists’ most elite unit of 
professional soldiers. The PLGA is estimated to have 10 000 men and women in its 
ranks, all highly trained and well armed.271 PLGA uses stolen police and army 
service weapons, AK rifles and self-loading rifles, light machine guns, carbines, 
.303s and landmines.272 They also have a technical squad that assembles grenades 
and manufactures its own 12-bore guns and ammunition.273 Apart from the PLGA 
is the Maoists’ secondary or “base” force of soldiers, some of whom carry 
rudimentary or traditional weapons, including bows and arrows. In a typical 
operational formation of 200 Maoists, about 60 to 70 will be PLGA members, and 
the remainder will be from the secondary force.274 
The Maoists’ military success has rendered them the sole effective 
government across thousands of square kilometers, and left them burdened with 
responsibilities more suited to a civilian government. As a result, in addition to the 
military command structure, the Maoists established a political wing to better 
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separate “mass work” and “military work”.275 The political wing is governed by a 
Central Committee, and subordinate regional bureaus, zonal committees and 
district committees report to it.276 In Dandakaranya277 (roughly congruous with 
Bastar district, Chhattisgarh), for example, the Maoists administer an elaborate 
structure of janatana sarkars (“people’s governments”)278 based on organizing 
principles from the Chinese revolution. Each janatana sarkar is elected by a cluster 
of villages representing between 500 and 5000 people. They each have nine 
departments, including defense, health and even public relations, and are 
responsible for development projects, including building irrigation ponds and 
water-harvesting structures. A group of janatana sarkars fall under an area 
committee, and three area committees compose a division. There are ten divisions 
in Dandakaranya alone.279 
The Maoists also administer large and extremely influential “above-
ground” civil society organizations. One such organization is Krantikari Adivasi 
Mahila Sangathan (KAMS), which advocates for women’s rights and campaigns 
against forced marriage and abduction, bigamy and domestic violence. KAMS 
members have also become a formidable force against police corruption and 
violence, often rallying in their hundreds or thousands to physically confront the 
police. With over 90 000 members, KAMS may well be the largest women’s 
organization in India.280 
The Maoist leadership is aging, and mostly hails from upper-caste and 
landed families in Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal. The current General Secretary 
of the party’s Central Committee is Muppala Lakshma Rao, a former schoolteacher 
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from Andhra Pradesh with degrees in science and education. He is over 60 years 
old, bespeckled, soft-spoken, and a member of the Velama caste, the traditional 
feudal lords in Telangana. His most common alias is Ganapathi (used on his 
official Facebook profile), though his name changes according to where he moves 
and he has many more. Some know him simply as “G.S.”281 Ganapathy, like the 
rest of the Maoist leadership, prefers to remain anonymous and rarely gives 
interviews.282 While the leadership is largely of advanced age, the majority of new 
Maoist recruits are boys and girls in their late teens and early twenties.283  
The majority of Maoist recruits also hail from dalit284  and adivasi285 
communities. As “untouchables” outside the Hindu caste system286, dalits face 
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acute social discrimination (including social and economic boycott), are often 
denied access to public services, and are largely relegated to lowest-wage 
employment. They are also victimized by routine and extreme violence, including 
murder, rape and arson by higher castes, as well as arbitrary arrest, torture and 
extrajudicial killings by police. Dalit women are frequently the target of sexualized 
violence.287 Maoists appeal to dalits by condemning caste discrimination and acts 
of violence against dalit communities. They also advocate broader reforms in the 
agricultural sector, in which many dalits are marginally employed.288 However, the 
Maoist movement is now dominated by adivasis, the minority indigenous peoples 
of India. Adivasis exist “at the bottom of all ladders – economic, social, cultural, 
and even psychological” and many live by clearing the jungle to cultivate 
subsistence crops.289 As a result, they have been particularly victimized by neo-
liberal reforms and by state violence throughout the post-independence period. 
Adivasis were at the centre of the Naxalbari uprising, and their fate has been 
inextricably linked with the Maoists ever since.290 
                                                                                                                                                         
principle of Indian society under colonial rule, systematizing diverse forms of social identity, 
community and organization. What is undeniable is that caste was, and still is, regarded by a wide 
range of commentators, from Hegel and Weber to Ambedkar, Gandhi and Nehru, as fundamental to 
Indian civilization and culture. In the post-independence period, India’s political leadership did little 
to address the issues of caste lurking beneath the surface of Indian democracy. Mohandas Gandhi 
himself remained a staunch defender of the caste system. He wrote at length in defense of the varna 
system, describing it as a rational division of labour, and his views on caste only evolved “slowly, 
grudgingly, and, it often seemed, tactically.” In Discovery of India, Jawaharlal Nehru argued that 
“the caste system does not stand by itself; it is part, and an important part, of a much larger scheme 
of social organization. It may be possible to remove some of the obvious abuses and to lessen its 
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Finally, almost half of Maoist cadres and well over half of Maoist 
commanders are women.291 It is significant that so many women have joined the 
Maoist movement and embraced the hard, and extremely dangerous, life of the 
guerrilla. Gender discrimination and violence against women are extremely 
common in India.292 However, the comparative frequency and severity of violence 
                                                       
291 Choudhary, “In Naxal Heartland”, 72. 
292 See e.g. Helen Pidd, “Why is India so bad for women?” The Guardian, 23 July 2012. 
www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/23/why-india-bad-for-women; “Bridal Slaves.” Al Jazeera 
English, 15 Nov 2011. 
www.aljazeera.com/programmes/slaverya21stcenturyevil/2011/10/2011101013102368710.html; 
Polgreen, Lydia. “Rapes of Women Show Clash of Old and New India.” New York Times, 26 March 
2011. www.nytimes.com/2011/03/27/world/asia/27india.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. Krishnan, 
Kavita. “Women Struggling Against Rape in India Find the Assange Case Hard to Digest.” 
HuffingtonPost.com, 21 December 2010. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kavita-krishnan/women-
struggling-against-_b_799544.html; Simon Denyer, “India Gang Rape Prompts Tough New Laws 
on Sexual Assault”, The Guardian Weekly 5 February 2013. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/05/india-gang-rape-stricter-laws. Amana Fontanella-
Khan, “India’s Feudal Rapists”, New York Times 4 June 2014. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/05/opinion/indias-feudal-rapists.html?_r=1. “India State Minister 
on Rape: ‘Sometimes It’s Right, Sometimes It’s Wrong”, The Guardian 5 June 2014. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/05/india-state-minister-rape-crimes-comment; “Indian 
Woman Gang-Raped at Police Station”, Al Jazeera English 12 June 2014. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2014/06/indian-woman-gang-raped-at-police-station-
201461264312257829.html; “Indian Police Investigate Alleged Station Gang Rape” Al Jazeera 
America 12 June 2014. http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/6/12/india-woman-gangrape.html.  
A series of high-profile gang rapes have recently shone a spotlight on the status of women in India. 
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December 2012 that made international headlines and prompted the government to enact tougher 
sexual assault laws. Other lurid stories abound, including that of a man in Rajasthan who, in June 
2012, beheaded his young daughter with a sword and paraded the bloody head around his village as 
a warning to other women against falling in love with lower-caste men. The next month in Baghpat, 
Uttar Pradesh, a group of village elders banned women from carrying mobile phones, choosing their 
own husbands and leaving their houses unaccompanied or with their heads uncovered. While these 
incidents are so extreme as to be considered newsworthy, violence and discrimination against 
women in India is widespread and often overlooked. Indeed, the challenges facing women in India 
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example, senior police officials estimate that only 10% of rapes in the Delhi region are reported). 
Violence against women also appears to be on the rise. According to the National Crime Records 
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directed at poor, dalit, lower caste and adivasi women is, even against this 
backdrop, quite shocking. Rape is routinely used to intimidate and humiliate lower 
caste and adivasi women, and is also very common in police custody.293 The 
Maoists recruit women members by speaking openly about the oppression of 
women, campaigning for women’s rights through organizations like KAMS, and 
working to break down the gender barriers that are still ubiquitous in rural India.294 
Their “peoples’ courts” have also gained a reputation for giving justice to women 
victimized by sexual violence.295  
The Maoists raise funds to cover their operating costs largely through 
“taxation” in the form of extortion. They collect protection money from traders, 
industrialists, and public works contractors operating in their area of influence, 
especially those involved in timber extraction and other forest produce 
harvesting.296 Seized internal documents produced by the Maoists in 2008 indicate 
that their income and operating budget are in the hundreds of millions of dollars. 
Other digital files seized from a Central Committee member indicated that the 
Maoists raised Rs. 10 billion (US$ 200 million) in 2007 alone.297 
                                                                                                                                                         
Bureau, there was a 7% overall increase in crimes against women between 2010 and 2011, 
(including an almost 20% increase in abductions and almost 10% increase in rape). Violence against 
women occurs against a backdrop of “moral policing”, which places blame for violence on women 
and seeks to curtail their activities outside the home. The attitude of India’s political leadership is 
often decidedly unhelpful. Mamta Sharma, chair of the National Commission of Women, attributed 
violence against women, at least in part, to an erosion of traditional values, and admonished women 
to dress more carefully to avoid assaults. The former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court suggested 
that rape charges could be dropped if a rapist agreed to marry his victim. Babulal Gaur, the BJP 
home minister responsible for law and order in Madhya Pradesh, recently opined of rape that 
“sometimes it's right, sometimes it's wrong”. The government and institutions of law seem 
unwilling or unable to address the crisis of violence against women in India. In July 2012, a vicious 
sexual assault in Guwahati, Assam was filmed and later broadcast with commentary on national 
television. Speaking of the incident, a columnist with Hindustan Times argued that, “this is a story 
of…disintegrating public governance when it comes to women. Men abuse women in every society, 
but few males do it with as much impunity, violence and regularity as the Indian male.” One 
newscaster on NDTV agreed, saying, “We have a woman president, we’ve had a woman prime 
minister. Yet in 2012, one of the greatest tragedies in our country is that women are on their own 
when it comes to their own safety… And as far as the law is concerned: who cares?”  
293 Kavita Krishnan, “Women Struggling Against Rape in India Find the Assange Case Hard to 
Digest.” HuffingtonPost.com, 21 December 2010. 
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The Maoists have been criticized for following an “outmoded ideology” or 
are accused of being little more than “bandits” and “extortionists” with no 
theoretical program to speak of. 298  This latter criticism, at least, appears 
groundless. The Maoists have developed a comprehensive theoretical and strategic 
program. Their literature is extensive and includes a party platform, many policy 
documents, and critical commentary on domestic and international events. They 
regularly issue press releases updating the public on the progress of the revolution.  
Prior to the merger, PWG adhered to a Marxist-Leninist program, while 
MCC embraced the Maoist line. Since the merger, Maoism has come to prevail in 
the united party. It is regarded, in the words of comrade Ramakrishna, as “the 
higher stage of the Marxist-Leninist philosophy.”299 Comrades Ganapathi and 
Kishan outlined the objectives of the united party in a press statement: 
The immediate aim and programme of the Maoist party is to carry on and 
complete the already ongoing and advancing New Democratic Revolution 
in India, as part of the world proletarian revolution by overthrowing the 
semi-colonial, semi-feudal system under the neo-colonial form of indirect 
rule, exploitation and control…This revolution will be carried out and 
completed through armed agrarian revolutionary war…Hence the 
countryside as well as the Protracted People’s War will remain as the 
‘center of gravity’ of the party’s work, while urban work will be 
complimentary to it.300 
 
Marxism-Leninism-Maoism forms the ideological basis guiding the Maoists’ 
thinking in all activities and spheres.301 
The Maoists officially defined their policy and objectives, in detail, in a 
series of documents released by the united party in 2004. One document, Party 
Programme, outlines the party’s general line and political platform to the rank and 
file. The Programme dismisses Indian democracy as “fraudulent” and disavows 
independence as “fake in essence…[a] semi-colonial and semi-feudal system under 
the neo-colonial form of indirect imperialist rule, exploitation and control”.302 It 
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alleges that agents of imperialism (the American variety), the IMF and the World 
Bank control the Indian government and key sectors of the Indian economy. It 
derides the Congress Party as an imperialist ploy to derail national liberation, and 
goes on to accuse the bureaucracy and judiciary of corruption, and of using the 
army, state police and paramilitary forces to suppress popular protest and political 
opposition with violence.303 
The Programme also denounces a wide range of institutions and practices 
that the Maoists consider responsible for many of India’s social ills. It condemns 
feudal landlords and religious institutions for perpetuating caste discrimination and 
superstition, as well as “medieval oppression” of dalits, adivasis, women and 
religious minorities, especially Muslims. It singles out the modern agricultural 
practices of the green revolution for impoverishing small farmers and rural 
labourers, and laments the environmental impact of recent industrialization. It is 
also critical of “Indian expansionism”, that is, colonialism within India’s borders, 
and describes the modern Indian state as a “prison-house of nationalities”.304 
The Programme tackles the unique problems faced by dalits and adivasis. It 
acknowledges dalit concerns about caste discrimination, violence, and low-wage 
employment and dismisses the government’s response as insufficient. It frames the 
dalit issue as fundamentally a class issue, decries untouchability as an “inhuman 
practice” and calls for complete abolishment of the caste system. It also identifies 
adivasis as “the most suppressed and repressed sections of Indian society”, 
observing that many adivasi communities have been deprived of their land and 
livelihoods by land seizures and harassment.305  
However, the Party Programme is disappointingly light on actionable 
policy proposals or reforms that can be implemented under India’s existing 
democratic structure. Rather, the Programme envisions a perfected people’s 
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democratic state rising from the dust of a protracted liberation war.306 Agriculture 
would be the foundation of the revolutionary state’s new economy. The people’s 
democratic state would confiscate all land belonging to landlords and to religious 
institutions and redistribute it among the landless poor and agricultural labourers. 
Growth in the agricultural sector would be encouraged by promoting cooperatives 
and ensuring higher prices for agricultural products, waiving the debts of small 
farmers and restoring agricultural subsidies, as well as investing in irrigation and 
other public projects. All banks, business enterprises and properties of both 
“imperialist capital” and of India’s “comprador bureaucratic bourgeoisie” would 
also be confiscated, and the revolutionary government would administer all 
monopoly industries and trade.307  
The revolutionary state would also work to improve public services and 
working conditions. It would, among other things, enforce an eight-hour workday, 
increase wage rates, and abolish contract and child labour. The revolutionary 
government would enforce unemployment allowance and social insurance, 
introduce universal medical care, provide social security for the disabled and the 
elderly, and abrogate all the personal debts of “the middle peasants and other 
toiling people.”308 
Moreover, the people’s state would work to abolish caste discrimination, 
untouchability and the caste system as a whole, while providing affirmative action 
for the social advancement of oppressed castes. Autonomy for all adivasi 
communities would be guaranteed, and the state would work to eradicate all forms 
of religious fundamentalism and the persecution of religious minorities. 
Additionally, the state would guarantee equal pay and property rights for women, 
abolish all forms of discrimination against women, and “end male domination and 
patriarchy.”309 (The Maoists cannot be accused of being unambitious.)  
The people’s democratic state would be governed by elected revolutionary 
people’s committees and people’s governing councils, enjoy universal suffrage, 
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and recognize the right to speech, assembly and collective bargaining. Finally, 
revolutionary government would recognize the right to self-determination, 
including the right to secession, of every nationality within India. The Maoists 
disavow expansionism, and promise to respect the territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of India’s neighbors. The new India would also nullify all “unequal” 
treaties and agreements with “imperialist” countries and, instead, act as a base to 
facilitate a global socialist revolution.310 This is not an exhaustive account of the 
Maoists’ policy platform. Party Programme is a lengthy document that reviews the 
general party line in much greater detail.311  
Within the movement there was never any question of the primacy of armed 
struggle. All Naxalite factions shared a belief in the use of violence and the 
“annihilation of class enemies” as a means to an end.  The Maoists fully reject 
participation in the electoral process and any engagement with India’s existing 
government, which they deride as a “bourgeois democracy.” They refuse to work 
with the Congress party or any other party, and are particularly infuriated by 
India’s “mainstream” communist parties, including CPI and CPI(M).312  
Since the merger, CPI-Maoist has reaffirmed its commitment to the 
classical Maoist “protracted people’s war” which aims not at immediate tactical 
goals, but instead at undermining the state and effecting a complete seizure of 
power.313 Indeed, the Party Programme rejects parliamentary democracy altogether 
and endorses armed struggle as the only means of achieving national liberation:  
…no bourgeois democracy ever came into being here. Extreme 
backwardness, poverty and illiteracy along with uneven social, economic 
and political conditions continue to exist. In this back drop the 
parliamentary system is an outright fraud framed in the deceptive name of 
“biggest democracy in the world” whereas all institutions like parliament, 
legislative assemblies, executive councils (including the so-called 
panchayati raj) are a thin cover for the autocratic rule representing the 
dictatorship of comprador bureaucratic bourgeoisie and feudal classes 
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subservient to imperialism…no viable solution of the fundamental 
problems of the people can be sought through using any parliamentary 
institution…the people’s political power can be established and advanced 
only through the path of protracted people’s war.314 
 
One top commander encapsulated the Maoists’ approach when, in responding to 
questions about the beheading of a policeman, he quoted Mao: “Revolution is not a 
dinner party. You’re talking about one beheading. In the French Revolution, they 
had to invent the guillotine to cut off heads.”315 
 
4.3 Post-1990 Growth 
Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Maoist insurgency continued 
to grow throughout the 1990s and into the new millennium. The last decade has 
been the movement’s most cohesive period, during which the movement not only 
survived, but thrived.316 Since 2004, the Maoist cadre has grown from a united 
force of about 7 000 guerrillas to over 60 000 soldiers and supporters altogether.317 
Reports vary. Some believe the Maoist armed wing is now 20 000 strong, with 
perhaps a further 40 000 full-time cadres.318 Other estimates place the number of 
armed guerrillas at 10 000, with a further 45 000 supporters.319 In any event, recent 
growth has been significant and unprecedented. 
This increase in membership occurred alongside territorial expansion. The 
Maoist heartland is the densely forested, resource-rich “tribal belt”, which runs 
through some of India’s poorest regions and is inhabited mostly by adivasis and 
dalits. 320  Beginning in Bastar district, Chhattisgarh, the insurgency spread 
exponentially. According to the Indian government, Maoists now control over 92 
000 square kilometers in and around Dandakaranya, and have an influential 
presence across approximately one third of the country. This so-called “red 
corridor”, extends from the Nepalese border to the southern coast, and includes 
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areas of Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, east Maharashtra, Andhra 
Pradesh (especially Telangana), Orissa, Bihar, West Bengal, and several others.321 
Former Home Minister Shrivaj Patil once claimed (falsely) that only 2% of 
India’s villages, and no more than 300 police stations, were affected by a Maoist 
presence, “as if that is not already an alarming figure.”322 Conflicting reports 
actually indicate that Maoists are influential in between 182 districts323 and 195 
districts324 across 16 states, or, that they effectively control more than 200 districts 
total (that is, almost one third of all districts).325 In Orissa alone, 10 of 30 districts 
are reportedly under Maoist control, police have abandoned 12 000 posts and 
precincts, and in some districts police officers refuse to wear uniforms while on 
duty. In Chhattisgarh, 16 of 20 police districts are considered “affected” by 
Maoists, and police often post 24-hour sentries in heavily armed watchtowers to 
protect their stations.326  
In most areas the guerillas operate underground but in others, like 
Dandakaranya, they are well entrenched and can stage cross-border operations into 
neighboring states.327 In 2005, about 900 people were killed in 1600 violent 
incidents involving Maoists, including some truly spectacular attacks such as a 
train holdup involving 250 guerrillas, and a jailbreak that freed 350 prisoners.328 
The following year, the number of Maoist-involved conflict incidents reportedly 
increased by a further 40%.329 In one such incident, in 2008, 150 guerrillas walked 
from Bastar to Nayagarh, Orissa, a journey of three and a half months, to raid a 
police armory where they captured 1200 rifles and 200 000 rounds of 
ammunition.330 
The Maoists plan to control a Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) 
extending from Nepal to Dandakaranya and on towards southern Andhra Pradesh. 
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The goal is to possess a contiguous stretch of territory that will drive a wedge 
through the heart of India and connect their forces with other Maoist groups 
operating in Nepal and Bhutan. Large parts of the proposed CRZ are already under 
Maoist influence or control, with only a few “link-ups” necessary to make the CRZ 
a reality.331 
The post-Cold War era, particularly since the unification of the movement, 
has been a period of great success and growth for the Maoist insurgency. What 
exactly was happening in the world’s largest democracy to swell support for what 
The Economist dismissed as “a primitive peasant rebellion based on an outmoded 
ideology”? 332  It is no coincidence that this recent surge in the Maoists’ 
membership, territory and influence corresponds with, first, India’s adoption of 
neoliberal economic policies, and second, political exclusion enforced by state 
violence. 
 
4.4  Neoliberalism 
India’s neo-liberal transformation was brought about, in part, by the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, one of India’s largest trading partners. Other events 
quickly conspired to make the change seem inevitable. In 1990, the invasion of 
Kuwait tripled the price of petroleum imports, creating a potential balance-of-
payments crisis virtually overnight. The following year, Rajiv Gandhi was 
assassinated and a Congress minority government was elected in the aftermath. By 
this time, government expenditures exceeded income by almost 10% and India was 
close to bankruptcy.333 In the summer of 1991, Manmohan Singh – mild-mannered 
academic and bureaucrat, former governor of the Reserve Bank of India and deputy 
chair of the Planning Commission – received a phone call from the new 
government of Narasimha Rao, inviting him to become finance minister.334 
Singh made it clear immediately on taking office that large structural 
changes were needed. An emergency rescheduling deal was secured with the IMF 
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and within weeks an emergency budget was presented to Parliament. On that 
occasion, Singh told MPs that India could no longer continue to live beyond her 
means. A second budget was later adopted which introduced more severe reforms 
than even the IMF had demanded. Indeed, the reforms Singh introduced went much 
further than addressing the liquidity crisis. They amounted instead to an abrupt and 
wholesale abandonment of Nehruvian socialism in favor of neo-liberalism.335 
What followed was a period of unprecedented liberalization in all sectors of 
the economy. Within weeks, Singh had moved to devalue the rupee, cut tariffs, 
dismantle subsidies and price controls, and deregulate trade and industry.336 
Successive rounds of trade reforms brought maximum tariff levels down from over 
300% in 1990-1991 to 40% by 1997-1998, while nominal weighted average import 
tariffs decreased from 87% in 1990-1991 to 20% in 1997-1998.337 Controls on 
foreign capital imposed by the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act were relaxed, the 
statutory liquidity ratio and incremental cash reserve were lowered, and interest 
rates were freed.338 The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act was also 
substantially reformed to relax controls and regulations. With few exceptions, the 
import licensing system and industrial licensing system were abolished.339 Many 
industries which had once been the sole preserve of state-owned enterprises were 
also opened up to the private sector, perhaps the most important being the power 
sector.340  
Although expenditures for India’s two largest subsidies, food and fertilizer, 
remained level, the share of subsidies in the GDP was actually reduced by inflation 
and as a percentage of total government expenditure.341 In a move that proved 
extremely unpopular, the price of subsidized food was continuously raised, and a 
debt-relief program for farmers, which cost Rs. 15 billion in 1991, was completely 
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phased out by 1996.342 Reforms in the agricultural sector were comparatively 
limited, but even so, state trading corporations were largely abandoned, and 
quantitative restrictions on agricultural trade were dismantled.343  
Reforms were not limited to the central government in Delhi but also 
extended down to state level. “Forced to compete with one another to create 
investor-friendly climates,” state governments became major facilitators of new 
investments. 344  They instituted complex tax reforms, quietly commercialized 
public-sector firms (some termed this “back-door privatization”), and reduced the 
time required for government clearances for land acquisition, pollution control 
approval and tax registration.345 
Reforms created considerable fiscal burdens for the state, including higher 
interest payments on government debt and lost revenues.346 Nevertheless, fiscal 
deficit as a percentage of GDP (the indicator sine qua non of true structural 
adjustment for many economists) dropped significantly in the reform period.347 
About these reforms, the World Bank pronounced that, “India has fundamentally 
altered its development strategy…ended four decades of planning and…initiated a 
quiet economic revolution.”348 Despite two successive changes of government – 
one to the left and the other to the right – economic reform in India continued 
unabated and was, in fact, strengthened throughout the decade.349 
The reforms were lauded as beneficial for economic growth and 
development. Growth was, admittedly, astounding. By 2000, India's GDP was 
growing 6.5% annually, then 8% in 2005350 and hovered around 9% in 2011.351 
India’s share of world exports also grew, as did its export earnings. The average 
rate of growth of Indian exports was over 20% annually throughout the past 
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decade.352 In 1991, export earnings stood at $18bn per year.353 A decade later, they 
had reached $45bn, and are now heading toward $200bn annually.354 A recent 
study by Goldman Sachs predicted that India would become the world’s third-
largest economy, behind China and the Unites States, within three decades.355 
Even so, other indicators showed serious deterioration after 1991. 
Government earnings fell, even though borrowing remained high. Inflation rose to 
unexpected levels, hovering around 9% wholesale.356 While non-agricultural GDP 
growth rates increased significantly, the growth rate of India's agricultural sector 
sharply declined; in recent years, the agricultural sector showed a growth rate of 
only 3%.357 This is especially significant because about 70% of India’s total 
workforce is employed in agriculture.358 Only around 1.3 million Indians (in a 
country of over one billion inhabitants) are believed to have any real stake in the 
“new economy”.359 
Declining growth in agriculture further widened the income disparity 
between urban and rural Indians. The ratio of per-worker income between the non-
agricultural and agricultural sectors rose from 3.5:1 in 1991, to 5.2:1 in 2001.360 
Indeed, while fewer than one-third of Indians live in urban centers, cities now 
generate as much as three-quarters of India’s GDP.361 And, while the rural labour 
pool continued to grow (by 66 million workers between 1993 and 2004), 
employment growth in agriculture remained stagnant.362 Additionally, the average 
size of landholdings in India was halved. Over 40% of India’s rural population had 
become landless by the year 2000. The clear implication is that rural incomes were 
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declining and agriculture was no longer viable for the majority of Indians for whom 
it is not only a livelihood but the only way of life they know.363  
Since adopting neo-liberal reforms, India has also struggled with balance-
of-payments issues. India’s trade surplus initially increased after 1991, but by 1998 
this trend had reversed, and trade surplus dropped well below its position in the 
early 1990s.364 Before the adoption of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, India 
spent only 43% of its export earnings financing imports. However, by the end of 
the 1990s more than 70% of export earnings were being used to finance 
agricultural imports alone.365 Between 1997 and 2007, cotton imports increased 
more than tenfold.366 Cotton exports almost completely evaporated by 2002, and 
India was forced to import cotton lint to meet domestic demand.367  
As might be expected, India experienced a dramatic decline in food security 
as it became ever more reliant on imports to meet domestic demand. Prior to the 
adoption of the WTO agreement, India met less than one percent of its domestic 
food demand from abroad.368 However, import dependence for total food increased 
almost three-fold in the first decade after the WTO agreement.  For example, 
within that period, import dependence doubled for pulses and increased almost 
eight-fold for vegetable oils such that by 2007 almost half of domestic demand was 
met by imports.369  
Peasant indebtedness also began to mount after 1991, a direct result of 
reforms in the agricultural sector. State subsidies for fertilizer, pesticides and other 
Green Revolution inputs were abandoned, leading to considerable price increases 
and higher production costs for small farmers. In 1994, India’s power sector was 
deregulated and privatized, resulting in massive tariff increases. As they did in 
1967, increased production costs forced small farmers to take on loans. But 
because reforms had also eliminated state-sponsored low-cost loan programs, most 
debtors sought relief from village moneylenders, who often charge usurious interest 
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rates of up to 60% per annum.370 By 2003, 76% of rural households were indebted 
to moneylenders.371 
Widespread indebtedness led to an epidemic of farmer suicides. It is 
estimated that since 1998, between 25 000 and as many as 100 000 Indian farmers 
have taken their own lives, many by swallowing the very pesticides that had 
beggared them.372 Other sources estimate as many as 150 000 debt-motivated 
suicides occurred over the last two decades.373 In Andhra Pradesh alone, for 
example, seven farmers killed themselves every day in 2004.374 A suicide help line 
established by the state government that year logged over 800 calls in its first week 
of operation.375 The vast majority of suicides occur in the most capital-intensive 
states where the cultivation of cash crops predominates.376 The Indian government 
has repeatedly denied that the suicide epidemic is driven by reforms, instead 
attributing farmers' crushing debt to personal problems like gambling and illicit 
affairs.377 
Rural India could now be described as a humanitarian disaster zone. India 
has higher rates of malnutrition than Sub-Saharan Africa and is home to one third 
of the world's malnourished children.378 It is estimated that nearly half of Indian 
children 5 years of age or younger suffer from malnutrition, and almost half of all 
Indian children below five years of age suffer from stunted growth.379 By 2005, the 
portion of India's rural population unable to access the recommended minimum 
number of calories per day had grown to a record high of 87%.380 An average rural 
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family today consumes 100 kg less food per year than they did in the early 
1990s.381 In 2010, the International Food Policy Research Institute ranked India 67 
out of 84 countries in its Global Hunger Index, a survey of child malnutrition, child 
mortality and calorie deficiency.382 All this has resulted in an increase in starvation 
deaths that, while initially common only in the least developed states, by 2005 had 
become common in more prosperous states such as Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and 
Madhya Pradesh. 383  According to the Planning Commission’s 2011 Human 
Development Report, all Indian states are currently facing “a serious to extremely 
alarming situation of hunger” even in Punjab and Gujarat, India’s most prosperous 
states.384 
Since then, the cost of staple foods has continued to rise. The price of staple 
foods increased over 9% in June of 2011 alone.385 A “snapshot” released in 2011 
showed a 17% increase in staple food prices over the same period in 2009.386 Food-
price inflation is especially cruel because Indians spend a larger portion of their 
disposable income on food than people in other developing economies.387 Other 
estimates now place food-price inflation between 14% and 20% annually.388 
According to the World Bank, 456 million Indians (over 40% of the total 
population) had incomes below the official poverty threshold of US$1.25 per day at 
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2005 PPP in 2008.389 A UN study found more people living below the poverty 
threshold in eight Indian states than in all of sub-Saharan Africa combined. To 
tackle such widespread poverty, the UN recommended more government 
involvement by, for example, improving access to health services and providing 
subsidized food grains. Instead, in a move as Machiavellian as it was genius, the 
Indian government simply redefined India’s official poverty line. Unsurprisingly, 
this was not actually helpful. In 2011, some estimates found that 77% of Indians 
continued to live below the poverty line.390 
Neo-liberal reforms have not only severely depressed the agricultural 
economy, but also systematically dismantled already deficient public services. The 
withdrawal of the state has been gradual but erratic, leaving farmers “ill equipped 
to compete” and unable to shoulder rising production costs. For example, the cost 
of powering irrigation pumps rose (in some villages, as much as seven-fold) as the 
government reduced power subsidies.391 The cost of fertilizer and pesticides also 
rose as subsidies were reduced. Simultaneously, banks and cooperative societies, 
“under pressure in an era of reform to show more fiscal responsibility,” have been 
increasingly reluctant to extend loans.392 As government services have declined, 
the Maoists have stepped in, garnering public support by working to meet the day-
to-day needs of India’s most vulnerable communities.  
The Maoist base of support is on the margins of Indian society, in the 
remote, forested tribal areas and impoverished villages where the Indian state is – 
save the police and army – largely invisible. In such places, there are no roads, 
wells, electricity or telephone lines, and no teachers, health workers or government 
officials. In the Dantewada district of Chhattisgarth, for example, 1161 of its 1220 
villages have no medical facilities, 214 have no primary schools, and the literacy 
rate is below 30%.393 In the very remotest regions, government services are 
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virtually non-existent, with some villages having last seen a development officer in 
the 1960s.394 
Maoist sarkars and services fill the vacuum. In many areas, especially parts 
of Bihar, Chhattisgarth, Orissa, Jharkland and Andhra Pradesh, the Maoists have 
effectively become the state, providing social services such as schools and medical 
clinics.395 Their presence has the effect of bringing usually absent teachers into the 
local schools, and they dig ponds and wells for a fraction of the cost of government 
projects. Volunteer doctors help train comrades in the Maoists’ health wing. They 
also combat illiteracy by teaching their members to read and write through the 
Young Communists Mobile School.396 The Maoists also administer their own 
brand of justice through jan adalat or "peoples' courts".397 Speaking about a rape 
trial held by a peoples’ court in Gopalpur-on-Sea, one Member of Parliament for 
Orissa conceded, “The Maoists gave justice there, and they have a family for 
life.”398 
Rahul Pandita, a journalist who has written extensively on the Maoist 
insurgency and conducted several interviews with its top leaders, has remarked on 
the close ties between villagers in Dandakaranya and the guerrillas. Maoists often 
share meals with villagers in their camps, and Maoist medical teams distribute 
medicine among them, including anti-malarial drugs, anti-venoms and vaccines. 
“In the absence of the State, it is the guerillas who they rely on for help in small 
ways,” writes Pandita. “Unsurprisingly, some end up joining them.”399 
Pavarvel village in Gadchiroli district, Maharashtra, notorious for being the 
site of the gang rape of a 13 year old girl by police, is an example of how growing 
poverty and a lack of government services cultivates support for the Maoists. 
Pavarvel has no electricity, (a government official arrives every year to collect 
electricity tax nevertheless), water is available only from a ramshackle bore pump, 
and villagers rely on the services of a witch doctor for their health care needs. Rice 
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is a luxury, and some residents are unable to marry because their neighbors cannot 
afford the traditional gift of rice for the ceremony. However, the Indian 
government was able to spare a helicopter to ferry the afore-mentioned girl to 
police custody when Maharashtra Police’s C-60 Commando group accused her of 
being a Maoist.400 
While generally unsympathetic to the Maoists or their politics, the 
commentator Patrick French nevertheless notes that, “they [have] tapped into an 
anger felt by many against the Indian state, and the sense that the fruits of 
economic liberalization were bypassing swathes of central and eastern India.”401 
Similarly, the director of Delhi's Institute of Conflict Management, Ajai Sahni, is 
quick to note that "these areas have fallen off the map of governance as economic 
liberalization has focused government attention elsewhere.” 402  While these 
comments contain rather more than a kernel of truth, they are nevertheless 
misleading. Because, as the experience of Pavarvel village indicates, the red 
corridor has not entirely escaped the notice of Delhi.  
Lest one believe that the red corridor’s isolation from the economic and 
political developments of the past two decades is responsible for the poverty and 
therefore for the Maoists, be assured that the red corridor does not lack for state 
attention or the interest of investors. Indeed, the red corridor “could in equal 
measure be called the ‘natural resources corridor’”403, and it has been the site of 
intensive economic activity under the new neo-liberal regime. It is not the absence 
of state intervention that drives the Maoist insurgency, nor, as French implies, is it 
that the inevitable fruits of liberalization have simply bypassed these remote 
regions. It is, rather, the neo-liberal reforms themselves and the state violence used 
to enforce them that generates support for the movement.  
Nowhere is this more in evidence than the forcible seizure of land by the 
state in the name of economic growth and development. Land acquisition by the 
Indian government for development projects is not a new phenomenon. In the fifty 
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years following independence, as many as 30 million Indians were displaced for 
the construction of dams, canals, power stations and other infrastructure. 404 
However, land seizures have accelerated at an unprecedented rate since the shift to 
neo-liberalism in 1991. Between 2001 and 2006, 500 000 hectares of forest were 
seized for development projects, a larger amount than was seized altogether in the 
previous 20 years combined. And, with few exceptions, land seizures have focused 
on the mineral-rich “tribal belt” that is the heartland of the Maoist insurgency, 
especially Orissa, Chhattisgarth and Jharkhand.405  
In these isolated corners of the country, India’s entrepreneurial class has 
found a wealth of buried treasure. Bauxite, high-grade iron ore, thorium, coal, 
chromites, nickel, manganese and other valuable minerals lie in vast quantities 
beneath forest and farmland. The potential profits are staggering. According to a 
recent Lokayukta406 report for Karnataka, mining companies can expect to earn Rs 
5000 per ton of iron ore while the government receives royalties of Rs 27. For 
bauxite, the figures are even higher.407 Between 2002 and 2005 alone, the Orissa 
state government signed 42 Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs)408  with 
corporations for proposed mining and other industrial operations.409 Since 2005, 
the governments of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and West Bengal have also signed 
hundreds of MoUs worth billions of dollars with multiple corporate houses. The 
MoUs are chiefly for mines, steel plants, sponge-iron factories and aluminum 
refineries, as well as supporting infrastructure like dams and power plants.410 In 
2005, Orissa became the site of India’s largest-ever foreign investment when it 
signed a MoU with the Pohang Steel Company of South Korea for the construction 
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of a US$12 billion steel plant.411 A Morgan Stanley report predicted that Orissa 
would draw up to $40 billion in new investments between 2006 and 2011.412  
Land seizures have been even more aggressive since the Special Economic 
Zone (SEZ) Act was adopted in 2006, which promotes the establishment of 
enclosed, duty-free enclaves for manufacturing and export. Since then, hundreds of 
sites have been approved for development, especially in Andhra Pradesh, 
Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra. It was initially projected that 400 000 
acres of land would be required for SEZ development, but a much larger figure is 
now more realistic.413 Between 2000 and 2007, over 220 SEZs were established – 
with another 250 in the planning stages – across 21 states.414 By 2008, 110 SEZs 
were approved for Chhattisgarh alone. Speaking about the SEZ Act and subsequent 
land scramble, the eminent Indian historian Sumit Sarkar stated, “India has never 
before witnessed the transfer of hundreds of thousands of hectares of agricultural 
land to private industry…[the SEZ policy] is liable to create one of the greatest 
land grabs in modern Indian history.”415 
For all of these projects, the land must be cleared and those living on it 
must be moved. 416  Land acquisitions are often conducted under the Land 
Acquisition Act of 1894, an archaic law from the British Raj that enables the 
appropriation of private land even when objections have been filed. As one 
commentator described, “in the name of ‘development’ the neoliberal Indian state 
is invoking colonial legislation to carry out a new process of colonization of its 
own people...”417 
Most affected landowners and displaced residents receive inadequate 
compensation for their lost property, if they receive any at all, and are rarely 
resettled or rehabilitated. In the case of Kalinganagar Industrial Area in Jajpur, for 
example, the Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation of Orissa admitted 
that about 1500 of 1800 displaced families did not receive compensation for which 
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they were eligible.418 Landless laborers, tenants, sharecroppers, and those who 
cannot produce written title to their land are eligible for no compensation 
whatsoever.419  
Adivasis have been especially victimized by land seizures. Adivasis have 
always had a difficult relationship with the Indian state, particularly in the guise of 
the Forest Department. The new constitution of independent India granted 
custodianship of tribal homelands to the state, effectively turning millions of 
adivasis into squatters. Further legislation criminalized many adivasi customs and 
traditional life-ways by, for example, forbidding hunting and harvesting forest 
produce on tribal lands. And, of the tens of millions of Indians displaced for dam 
construction in the post-independence period, the great majority were adivasis.420 
Adivasi communities continue to be displaced for mining and development projects 
in the neo-liberal reform era. In fact, while they comprise less than 10% of the 
national population, they are the objects of over 50% of land evictions.421 Rarely do 
they have any legal recourse, since they often cannot produce legal title to the lands 
of their ancestors.422  
Rajarhat New Town, a planned neighborhood of Calcutta, West Bengal, is 
emblematic of the land seizures process. Land acquisition for the project began in 
1996. Using the Land Acquisition Act (and in violation of many of its already lax 
provisions), the state seized over 3000 hectares of farmland in 18 districts.423 Most 
landowners were small or marginal farmers, and almost all refused to comply 
because the compensation offered to them was so low. Nevertheless, the land was 
cleared and construction began. To remove obstinate farmers the government 
dumped truckloads of silt onto standing crops and removed river pumps that 
irrigated thousands of acres. In some cases, land speculators simply seized 
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farmland without following any legal process and state departments later gave 
these fraudulent transfers legal cover.424  
The tens of thousands of farmers who lost their land, and the thousands 
more local sharecroppers and laborers who lost their jobs, face a bleak future of 
low-wage and irregular employment. According to Nilotpal Dutta of the Rajarhat 
Anti-Land Acquisition Committee, 
Women of land owning families work as maidservants if they’re lucky. 
Many have been forced into prostitution. Trafficking is rife, and alcoholism 
and drug abuse have risen alarmingly. Hundreds of men have become petty 
thieves or joined crime syndicates.425 
 
One reporter for Open magazine described the land acquisition process for Rajarhat 
New Town as, “India’s worst land acquisition story; nowhere else has so much 
land been taken over by the state with such brute force from so many farmers, 
many of whom haven’t received a single rupee as compensation and are now 
virtually destitute.”426  
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Importantly, this nation-wide, systematic dispossession of land and 
subsequent industrialization has produced no improvements in government services 
or in social indicators. Orissa state is an excellent example. Despite billions of 
dollars worth of investment, in 2005 Orissa still boasted India's highest poverty 
rate, with fully half the population living below the poverty line.427 The literacy 
rate among adivasis in that state hovered below 40%.428 As one PLGA company 
commander described the neo-liberal development model, “the government is bent 
upon taking out all the resources from this area and leaving the people nothing.”429 
Clearly, these areas have not simply “fallen off the map of governance” or been 
“bypassed by the inevitable fruits of economic liberalization.” They are, despite 
their seeming isolation, very much at the epicenter of the neo-liberal revolution. 
They are the heart of the “new India”. The problem, it seems, is that there is no 
room in the new India for the people of Bastar, Dandakaranya or Naxalbari.  
The Indian government has recognized the connection between growing 
poverty and the Maoist presence. As stated in a Ministry of Home Affairs annual 
report,  
Naxalites operate in the vacuum created by functional inadequacies of field 
level governance structures, espouse local demands, and take advantage of 
prevalent disaffection and feelings of perceived neglect and injustice among 
the underprivileged and remote segments of population.430 
 
Rahul Pandita similarly highlighted poverty and violent land acquisitions as 
reasons for the movement’s expansion: 
It took many years for the government of India to very reluctantly accept 
the fact that the Maoist insurgency is not just a law and order problem but a 
socio-economic concern. But while on the one hand they have accepted it, 
on the ground nothing has changed. The answer is to promote 
development…I think [the Maoist insurgency] is going to expand because 
of the kind of policies we have in these areas. On one hand, you have 
hundreds of thousands of tons of wheat and other food grains rotting in 
government godowns. As long as people keep on dying of hunger, as long 
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as their lands are taken away, as long as they are displaced and their lives 
are destroyed; it’s only going to expand.431 
 
Rural Development Minister Jairam Ramesh echoed this sentiment in a lecture he 
gave in Delhi in October 2011. In his own words,  
Let us be clear, paramilitary and police action cannot and should not be the 
driving force. The driving force has necessarily to be development and 
addressing the daily concerns of people, of people who have every reason to 
feel alienated.432 
 
However, this is exactly the approach the Indian government has refused to take. 
Rather, the government has responded with increasingly violent military 
intervention and ever more draconian, anti-democratic laws.433  
 
4.5 Political Exclusion Enforced by Violence 
 In addition to neo-liberal reforms, the Naxalite-Maoist insurgency’s recent 
growth has also been driven by political exclusion largely enforced by violence. 
India’s political culture has been characterized by dynasticism, corruption and 
exclusion since Independence. Dynastic politics “has become the most salient 
feature of Indian democracy, and nearly all political parties are ridden with it.”434 
For example, Prime Minister Nehru was succeeded as prime minister by his 
daughter Indira Gandhi, who was succeeded by her son, Rajiv.435 Rajiv Gandhi’s 
widow eventually succeeded him as party president.436 Their son, Rahul Gandhi, is 
now vice-president of Congress and campaigned for “his” party in the latest 
national election. Despite losing disastrously to Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata 
Party, he is still regarded as a prime minister-in-waiting and “reluctant prince”, and 
is expected to lead the official opposition in Lok Sabha.437 In fact, in the 67 years 
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since independence, the Gandhi family has been directly or indirectly in power for 
over 50 years.438  
The Gandhi family is perhaps India’s most famous political lineage, but it is 
far from the only one. Each party and each state has its own political dynasties, 
with power passing from fathers to sons, aunts to nephews, grandfathers to 
granddaughters and so on.439 In a particularly egregious case the former Chief 
Minister of Bihar, Lalu Yadav, installed his semi-literate wife as his replacement 
after he was arrested for fraud.440 Rahul Gandhi himself has admitted that Indian 
politics “depends on who you know or are related to,” and has expressed a desire 
for change.441Jaswant Singh, former leader of the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party 
(and former finance, foreign and defense minister) has argued that dynastic politics 
encourage corruption, writing that, “inherited political power is the very antithesis 
of democracy…the ‘dynasticism’ that has taken such a firm grip on much of Indian 
politics plays a large role in fostering corruption.”442 
 Corruption is indeed an ongoing and severe problem. India ranks 87th on 
Transparency International’s Index of Corruption.443 In many cases corruption is so 
blatant and absurd that it appears to be a joke. In recent state legislative elections, 
parties of every stripe rushed to lure potential voters by offering bribes and gifts, 
ranging from free computers to cows to a regular caste quota in certain jobs.444 The 
incumbent chief minister of Uttar Pradesh, who goes by the singular name 
Mayawati, is in the process of building a sprawling park on the outskirts of Delhi 
adorned with statutes of herself and of elephants, her party symbol. The statues 
alone reportedly cost the state treasury an estimated $120 million.445 Career Point, 
a school for those preparing to join India’s bureaucracy, recently opened a class for 
aspiring politicians, which (as it advertises) “trains aspiring leaders how to 
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circumvent and manipulate electoral laws to their advantage.”446 In 2010, several 
Indian citizens launched the website ipaidabribe.com to collect anonymous reports 
of bribes. In little over a year, the site had collected almost half a million reports.447 
Jaswant Singh describes corruption in India as “crippling all organs of the 
state and reaching into its highest offices.” Indeed, the ruling Congress party has 
recently been mired in a number of major corruption scandals, including a 
telecommunications license scam wherein some $30 billion may have been 
syphoned from state coffers through corrupt practices.448 During the 2010-2011 
winter session of Parliament, the opposition demanded a Joint Parliamentary 
Committee to inquire into the scandals but the government would not concede. 
This developed into a paralyzing standoff, during which Prime Minister Singh 
expressed concerns about the future of parliamentary democracy in India. In fact, 
not a single item of legislative, governmental or other business was completed 
during that entire session.449 
Corruption at all levels also interferes with the state’s ability to deliver vital 
public services. In 2005, the government in Delhi established the National Rural 
Health Mission, which aimed to overhaul rural health care delivery by building 
hundreds of thousands of new clinics and hiring millions of new health workers. 
However, this vast increase in health funds was an invitation to corruption. 
Reportedly, contracts worth US$ hundreds of millions were granted without 
competitive bidding, and millions more were paid in full to contractors who did not 
complete their work, leaving clinics half-built and unequipped.450 Uttar Pradesh, 
home to 200 million people and India’s most populous state, was further 
scandalized by the murder of three chief medical officers who oversaw the city of 
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Lucknow’s health funds. The murders are widely attributed to the doctors’ refusal 
to remain silent about corruption.451  
While corruption in government is extremely common, corruption in the 
private sector may be equally prevalent.452 India’s billionaires (55 in total as of 
2011453) control a considerably larger share of the national wealth than billionaires 
do in other economies (about 1/6th of India’s total GDP).454 Most derive their 
wealth from land, natural resources, or government contracts and licenses. 
Consequently, their success is made possible in no small part by their “coziness 
with powerful politicians who help arrange environmental clearances, land use 
rights and other thorny issues.”455 In a single year, from 2006 to 2007, the 
combined wealth of India’s billionaires rose by a staggering 60% to US$170 
billion. According to the reputed Indian economist Amit Bhaduri, this phenomenal 
increase would not have been possible except through the transfer of seized land 
from the state to private entities.456  
Corporate influence extends to foreign policy. According to Ashok Malik, a 
journalist and researcher of Indian private sector diplomacy, Indian diplomats are 
now trained to consider the needs of India’s private sector as “a primary part of 
their job”.457 Such close public-private partnerships have raised accusations of 
cronyism. According to Arvind Subramanian, an economic advisor to the Indian 
government, “no question, there is an oligarchy developing that has an enormous 
amount of influence.”458 
Dynasticism and corruption, while deplorable, would not be strictly relevant 
to the discussion at hand except that they contribute in a very real way to political 
exclusion. Dynasticism “retards a democracy’s ability to respond to its citizens’ 
needs and people’s empowerment in general,” and recent studies have 
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demonstrated a correlation between dynastic politics, poverty and income 
inequality.459 It also discourages participation in the political process. In the words 
of Dr. Ashok Acharya of the University of Delhi,  
[India has] patronage politics due to a lack of democracy at the grassroots 
level, where people cannot rise through the ranks…the common man does 
not want to enter the fray due to the complexity of the system. The system 
disincentivizes the new comers into politics.460  
 
Corruption also contributes to the political exclusion of economically and socially 
vulnerable groups. By crippling Parliament and interfering with the capacity of the 
bureaucracy to deliver vital services, corruption fosters a sense that citizens cannot 
expect assistance or redress from the legitimate political process. As Jaswant Singh 
has argued,  
At the heart of any functioning democratic order must be a firm regard for 
the rule of law. When this is absent, political and economic troubles fill the 
void. That is India’s situation today, as many high officials display willful 
disregard for the letter of the law and flaunt their defiance of its spirit. Their 
corruption is debilitating not only India’s parliament, but its democracy as 
well.461 
 
He goes on to argue that “what remains of representative institutions is an empty 
shell of residual decision-making, with bribery being the only real conversation of 
government.”462 In this political climate, when the very institutions of democracy 
and the political process itself are both ineffective and highly suspect, it is not at all 
surprising that some might reject Indian democracy entirely. 
While dynasticism and corruption, and the alienation they create, exclude 
large swathes of the Indian public from the political process, they are perhaps not 
the most significant factor promoting political exclusion in India today. Rather, it is 
the remarkable level of political violence in India that may be most responsible for 
the political exclusion that drives Maoist support, especially among vulnerable 
groups including dalits and adivasis.  
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The Indian government has a long history of violent political repression. As 
early as the 1950s, communists were placed under preventive detention.463 During 
the notorious state of emergency between June 1975 and March 1977, India’s many 
communist parties were banned, their members were arrested, and radicals were 
“hunted like mad dogs”.464 India’s “authoritarian tendency” is often said to have 
reached its pinnacle during The Emergency. But since then, the state’s means of 
coercion have grown dramatically in terms of overall manpower, special units, and 
emergency powers. By 1980, the number of police officers in India had doubled to 
almost one million. By 1986, the Indian armed forces had grown to over 1.2 
million members and regularly consumed 20% of government funds.465 Only with 
a willful blindness could one fail to see how highly militarized and India has 
become, or how widespread state violence has become in the post-Cold War 
period.  
The exclusion of outsiders from the political process is first enforced by a 
number of draconian, anti-democratic laws that punish dissent with violence and 
threats of violence. The Prevention of Terrorism Act, passed in 2002, has made 
evidence collected through torture admissible in court and has been used to arrest 
and threaten peaceful protestors. In Jharkhand alone, it has been used to indict over 
3000 people (mostly adivasis) under suspicion of being Maoist supporters. The 
Armed Forces Special Powers Act, in force in many north-eastern states, allows 
army officers to use lethal force against anyone suspected of disturbing public 
order.466  
In Chhattisgarh, the Special Public Security Act allows police to hold 
individuals without bail for several years, including activists who were imprisoned 
for mailing evidence of police and army atrocities to Members of Parliament.467 
The Act was also used to imprison Binayak Sen, a celebrated doctor, human-rights 
activist and official of the People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL). A vocal 
critic of Chhattisgarh’s counter-insurgency strategies, Sen was detained for over a 
                                                       
463 Robb, A History of India, 223. 
464 Rahul Pandita, “The Phantom Who Fell,” Open Magazine, 3 December 2011. 
465 Robb, A History of India, 223. 
466 Roy, Listening to Grasshoppers, 28-29. 
467 Roy, “Walking with the Comrades”. 
 89 
year without trial for allegedly passing on letters from an imprisoned Maoist whom 
he treated in jail. The Act has also been used to detain journalists, cloth merchants 
(for providing Maoists with camouflage uniforms) and doctors (for providing 
Maoists with prescriptions).468 As The Economist noted regarding Sen’s case, “the 
state does not really need to convict…The authorities have shown all too clearly 
that they can punish people under their ‘special law’ without having to prove their 
case in court.”469 In practice, these laws target vulnerable groups including dalits, 
adivasis and the political left.470 
The Indian state also enforces political exclusion by passively allowing the 
political left and other vulnerable groups to be targeted for violence. Civil activists, 
including activists engaged in relatively benign work such as scrutinizing 
government and corporate corruption, have been targeted. Controversy surrounding 
the Right to Information Act is illustrative. Since its adoption in 2006, civil 
activists have tried to use the Act to disclose information concerning corruption 
and collusion between politicians and large corporations. However, many have 
been beaten, harassed and, in at least a dozen reported cases, murdered. In such 
cases, the police often fail to investigate.471 Activists organizing against mining and 
other industrial development projects are also targeted. For example, Sister Valsa 
John, a Catholic nun who (peacefully) organized Santhal adivasis against open-cast 
coal mining in Jharkhand state, was killed in 2011 when a large group of men 
entered her home and butchered her with axes. Prior to her death, Sister Valsa 
claimed that mine agents had threatened her, and the men investigated for her 
killing held contracts with Panem Coal Mines. Still, police initially blamed both 
Maoists and adivasis for the murder.472 Speaking about the recent murder of an 
activist in Gujarat who exposed a local politician's ties to illegal mining, the 
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prominent human rights lawyer Anand Yagnik argued that, "the message has gone 
out that if you resort to your right to information to try to harass a political person, 
even after your murder, that man will go scot-free.”473  
This impunity extends to the treatment of other vulnerable groups, 
especially dalits. Dalits are often violently attacked by members of upper castes, 
including feudal landlords, as a form of collective punishment intended to 
discourage dissent. Reportedly, dalits were victimized in more than 115 000 
“atrocities” between 2008 and 2010, with the number of incidents rising over 10% 
in 2009. According to the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, 
dalit women in particular are targeted by sexual violence, “from state actors and 
dominant castes who employ these methods to inflict political lessons and crush 
dissent within the [dalit] community.”[emphasis mine] Local police and politicians, 
of all parties, often fail to investigate these crimes or to charge the perpetrators, and 
instead intimidate the victims.474  
The Indian state is not only complicit in ensuring that caste violence goes 
unreported and unpunished. Rather, police, politicians and other state actors are 
often agents of violence themselves. Police frequently target dalits for arbitrary 
arrest, torture and extrajudicial killing.475 Mass protests by the dalit community, 
such as a series of bandhs476 held in Maharashtra in 2006, are often quashed by 
police with lathi (baton) charges, curfews and widespread arrests, often resulting in 
civilian deaths.477 The failure of the democratic state to address dalit interests – 
indeed, the state’s participation in their oppression – has led many dalits to join the 
Maoists. One anecdote told by dalit caste Muslims in the documentary India 
Untouched: Stories of a People Apart, is illustrative: 
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Pandra village in Lohardagga district has about a hundred families of the 
Pamadiya caste [Muslim dalit caste]. During one Namaz they were beaten 
black and blue for praying in the front lines. This led to violent clashes and 
in the end the Pamadiyas joined the Maoists. How long could they go on 
fighting? ...they have to take help from the Communists to offer Namaz.478 
 
In this way, relentless caste discrimination and violence have directly benefited 
Maoists’ recruitment efforts.  
State violence is especially common – almost ubiquitous – in the execution 
of land seizures. Adivasis are especially vulnerable. They are frequently harassed 
by the Forest Department and targeted by “scorched village” campaigns intended to 
drive them away from their ancestral forests.479 Villages that try to resist land 
seizures attract extremely violent responses from the state. For example, when Tata 
Group signed a MoU in 2004 with Orissa state for 2 000 acres in Kalinganagar and 
delayed compensation for displaced families, the residents refused to leave their 
land in protest. Company bulldozers, protected by a cadre of 300 police officers, 
began leveling the residents' homes. An altercation ensued which left a dozen 
villagers dead and dozens more injured. In another incident, local farmers and 
fishermen protested the building of a steel plant in Jagatsinghpur which would 
cover 4 000 acres of land, affect 11 villages and displace or otherwise impact 22 
000 people. Protesters were attacked by both company security and 18 battalions of 
state police wielding improvised bombs.480 In the case of Rajarhat New Town in 
Culcutta, West Bengal, farmers who protested the land seizures were harassed and 
intimidated by the notorious harmad bahini which, according to activists, “issued 
threats, assaulted people and even murdered some. The police acted as their 
auxiliary force.”481 
In numerous other incidents, police have razed makeshift camps, and fired 
tear gas and live ammunition at women and children. Police have also been 
accused of various atrocities, including gang rapes and post-mortem mutilations.482 
In March 2007, the government of West Bengal ran afoul of farmers and villagers 
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in Nandigram when it attempted to seize land for the establishment of a SEZ. The 
residents refused to leave, barricading their villages and sabotaging roads and 
bridges. Fourteen villagers were killed when police stormed the barricades, and the 
government was forced to suspend the project. The incident was one of the worst 
non-sectarian massacres in recent times and has since become known as “the 
Nandigram violence”. It serves as a powerful illustration of “why violent resistance 
has become an attractive option for those with no political voice.”483 
It increasingly appears that the most vulnerable groups in India, including 
the poor, dalits, adivasis and marginal farmers, are indeed voiceless. Land seizures 
are illustrative of how effectively these groups have been excluded from the 
political proces. Land seizures have become an explosive political issue throughout 
India and have provoked vigorous public protest. Important civil society 
organizations like The National Alliance of Peoples' Movements have coordinated 
broad resistance campaigns, including a nation-wide month-long protest against the 
SEZ Act in 2007.484 The SEZ Act was also condemned by no less a national figure 
than Sonia Gandhi who, alongside other national ministers, declared that farmland 
should never be seized for SEZs. However, grassroots protests, including hunger 
strikes and demonstrations numbering in the hundreds of thousands, have proved 
fruitless. One such demonstration in September 2006, at which 35, 000 farmers 
protested, resulted in no redress whatsoever.485 Land seizures have proceeded 
apace in the face of overwhelming public opposition. 
Indian democracy has been hollowed-out to such an extent, and the space 
for political dissent has shrunk so dramatically, that democratic, non-violent means 
of protest have proven completely ineffective.486 What has proved effective is the 
threat of Naxal-style retaliation. In 2008, when the government of West Bengal 
tried to seize 1000 acres outside Calcutta for the construction of a Tata Motors 
plant, a local activist and politician, Mamata Banerjee, threatened violence.487 The 
state government was forced to make concessions to the aggrieved farmers and 
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Tata dismantled its plant.488 Maoist guerrillas, and the movement’s above-ground 
organizations, are reported to be actively mobilizing farmers against land seizures. 
They have mobilized peasants to occupy surplus land and have mounted militant 
campaigns.489 For many years, aluminum companies avoided the bauxite mining 
areas of Andhra Pradesh because of the risks. Naxalite groups also threatened 
mining projects in Jharkhand where Tata Steel and other companies had planned to 
build multi-billion dollar plants.490 These land seizures, and the Maoists’ seemingly 
singular success in derailing them, have fuelled the Maoist insurgency perhaps 
more than any other single factor.  
However, it is in the counter-insurgency war against the Maoists that the 
extreme – and counter-productive – nature of state violence in India is most on 
display. Delhi denies that the counter-insurgency campaign, called Operation 
Green Hunt, is a “war”, although it certainly looks like one. Between 300 000 and 
400 000 paramilitary forces have been deployed in Maoist-affected areas across ten 
states, and Delhi has allocated over Rs. 1 trillion for internal security. Although the 
Indian army has not yet directly participated in operations against the Maoists, the 
North, Central, South, West and Eastern commands of the Indian army have all 
formed special units to offer advice, training, intelligence and technology to state 
police departments. In the opinion of the Maoist command, it is the Indian army 
that “formulated the strategy for the war”.491 
Delhi has also assisted state governments in the red corridor by providing 
them with armored vehicles, minesweeping equipment and imaging technology to 
help locate remote Maoist camps. In 2005, the Counter-Terrorism and Jungle 
Warfare Training School opened near Raipur and has since trained thousands of 
local police to "fight a guerilla like a guerilla."492 Twenty similar schools are being 
planned across India. High-ranking Indian police officers are reportedly being 
trained in the techniques of “targeted assassination” by no less than Israel’s 
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Mossad.493 Israel is also reported to be supplying India with laser range-finders, 
thermal imaging equipment and unmanned drones.494 Only when the government 
turned to aerial assaults did the Supreme Court finally intervene, ruling that the 
state could not use such overwhelming, indiscriminate force against its own 
citizens.495 
In the war against the Maoists, the line between police and military has 
become blurred. One of the clearest indications of this fading distinction, and one 
of the state’s most dangerous weapons, is the Central Reserve Police Force 
(CRPF). CRPF is best known for its operations in Indian-occupied Kashmir, but 
has also been tasked with fighting the Maoists. CRPF officers are armed with sub-
machine guns but often wear plain clothes. They have been accused of various 
abuses, including razing homes and villages, and “disappearing” villagers.496 Police 
have also been known to use torture as an interrogation technique, including on 
children.497 
States also make use of “Special Police Officers” (SPOs), tribal villagers 
employed as ad hoc police officers. SPOs are usually young men between the ages 
of 18 and 25, very poorly trained, who receive a stipend of 3 000 rupees per month 
for their participation in police actions in “Maoist-infested” areas.498 They are 
particularly associated with human rights violations, including sexual assaults and 
civilian deaths. As of 2011, there were about 40 000 SPOs in use across India.499 
(The Supreme Court recently ruled that Chhattisgarh must stop using SPOs in its 
operations. SPOs will have to be disarmed and disbanded although the state has no 
rehabilitation policy. Observers note that this will likely leave them at the mercy of 
the Maoists.)500 
In Chhattisgarh, a second paramilitary force, the Salwa Judum, has also 
taken up the fight against the Maoists. Salwa Judum, which means “the purification 
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hunt”, is a citizens’ militia recruited from among adivasis. It was established and 
funded by the Chhattisgarh government in conjunction with local businesses, 
especially those involved in iron ore extraction.501 (It is said to be pure coincidence 
that Salwa Judum was established one day after Chhattisgarh signed a MoU with 
the Tata Group.)502 Salwa Judum quickly (and obviously) became a paramilitary 
arm of government authority. Some 5 000 of its members were commissioned as 
SPOs and offered training and firearms by the state.503  
Salwa Judum drove adivasi villagers out of the forests using a "scorched 
village" policy designed to starve the Maoists of local support.504 The survivors 
were either enticed with monetary rewards or forcibly herded into dozens of 
makeshift refugee camps guarded by police and military battalions. There, the 
government had established "food-for-work" schemes, in effect turning the camp 
residents into a free source of labour. Through this process, not only did the 
government foster fratricidal conflict amongst the adivasi, but also managed to 
remove large populations from the land, freeing it up for enclosure and sale.505  
Salwa Judum and the refugee camps it operates are controversial. Then 
leader of the opposition in Chhattisgarh, Mahendra Karma of the Congress party, is 
one of its most ardent supporters. He stresses the movement's supposedly 
spontaneous, peaceful origins, while linking its work to America’s broader War on 
Terror. In reality, however, Salwa Judum members have been widely accused of 
intimidation, rape and murder in the course of their work, and families refusing to 
join "combing operations" (the pillaging and razing of villages) have been extorted 
and assaulted.506 Some estimates place the number of Salwa Judum victims in the 
thousands. A 2006 report compiled by a number of civil liberties groups concluded 
that Salwa Judum has served only to escalate violence, and claim that, "Salwa 
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Judum and the paramilitary operate with complete impunity. The rule of law has 
completely broken down."507 
The severity of state violence in India suggests that the goal is not just to 
impose neo-liberal reforms, but perhaps to also eradicate those who have no place 
in the new neo-liberal economy (or who are unfortunate enough to have oil, coal or 
bauxite sitting beneath their forests and farmland). Binayak Sen, an advocate of 
adivasi rights who was incarcerated for two years on charges of sedition, equates 
the counter-insurgency war to genocide: 
These focused processes of expropriation are forcing these people who are 
already living on the brink of starvation off the land and into more severe 
poverty. And I would submit that the condition that is being created today 
in large sections of the population, particularly those living in the forest 
areas that are mineral rich…correspond to a genocidal situation.508 
 
Indeed, the language of genocide is frequently invoked when discussing 
Maoists. Indian states and districts with a high Maoist presence are said to be 
“Maoist infested”. 509  Chhattisgarh state calls the counter-insurgency war a  
"sanitization campaign”, and the state-backed citizens’ militia “the purity hunt.”510 
This approach has trickled down to the personnel who fight the counter-insurgency 
war on the ground. Nalin Prabhat, the feared superintendent of police in Warangal, 
who is, in many ways, the face of Indian democracy in his district, said of the 
Maoists, “…the ones who don’t want to surrender will be surgically excised, like 
unhealthy tissue. I sleep easily at night…The human rightists don’t realize we are 
dealing with beasts.511 
The irony of this situation, and the main point here, is that this extreme state 
violence is directly and significantly responsible for the recruiting and operational 
success of the Maoists in recent years. In November 2000, the creation of 
Jharkhand state and subsequent counter-insurgency operations launched by the new 
state administration pushed the People’s War Group and the Maoist Communist 
Centre into closer cooperation. In November 2002, a joint statement issued by both 
                                                       
507 "A Spectre Haunting India," The Economist. 
508 Garda, “Inside India’s Red Corridor”. 
509 “Q&A: The Future of India’s Maoist Movement,” The Wall Street Journal.  
510 Walker, “Neoliberalism on the Ground in Rural India”, 593-594. 
511 French, India: A Portrait, 169-170. 
 97 
groups in Patna, Bihar, cited Jharkhand’s indiscriminate use of the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act against Maoist cadres and supporters for having “compelled them to 
iron out differences.”512 Growing cooperation between the two groups quickly led 
to a very successful merger in 2004, which improved their “firepower, ‘battle 
ability’ and levels of modernization”, significantly bolstering their operational 
capacity.513  
State violence also directly facilitated the Maoists’ improved recruiting 
success. The Maoist cadre’s growth since the competing factions were forced to 
merge has been significant and unprecedented: from about 7, 000 to over an 
estimated 60, 000 guerrillas and supporters.514 On a more personal level, many 
Maoists recount joining the movement after witnessing theft, arson, gang-rapes, 
murders and mutilations during police and army assaults on their villages. This is 
particularly the case for female recruits.515  
While the Maoists take special pains to reach out to women by tackling 
gender violence and discrimination, the most significant factor in female 
recruitment seems to be the extreme state violence of the counter-insurgency war. 
Women living in Maoist-affected areas are particularly vulnerable to violence 
meted out by state security forces. In the red corridor, a bob-cut hairstyle is often 
taken as evidence that a woman is a Maoist and is enough to warrant arrest or 
execution. KAMS516 especially, has drawn the ire of police for exposing corruption 
and, as a result, its members are frequently targeted for rape and sexual mutilation 
during police raids and Salwa Judum hunts.517  Women who accuse security 
personnel of rape or other violence are often branded as "extremists" or 
"insurgents", and are threatened, abducted, arrested or killed.518 It is perhaps 
unsurprising, then, that women in the red corridor turn to the Maoists for protection 
and for power. As one (entirely unsympathetic) police superintendent explained it,  
                                                       
512 “Communist Party of India-Maoist,” South Asia Terrorism Portal. 
513 “Communist Party of India-Maoist,” South Asia Terrorism Portal. 
514 “Communist Party of India-Maoist,” South Asia Terrorism Portal. 
515 Roy, “Walking with the Comrades”. 
516 Krantikari Adivasi Mahila Sangathan, the Maoists’ civil society organization for women.  
517 Roy, “Walking with the Comrades”. 
518 Krishnan, “Women Struggling Against Rape in India.” 
 98 
They think it’s romantic to be a revolutionary. For the women, it means 
they no longer get treated like a sexual commodity. If you go into a village 
with a gun, even the rich landlords have to kiss your feet.”519[emphasis 
mine] 
 
Many Maoists do indeed cite violent police and army assaults on their villages as 
their motivation for joining the movement.520 All this helps to account for the 
extraordinarily high number of women recruited into the party, and demonstrates 
how increased state violence has helped propel the Maoists’ recent growth.  
The so-called “siege of Lalgarh” is an excellent illustration of how a 
backdrop of poverty, combined with state violence, has generated support for the 
Maoists. The Lalgarh region of West Bengal is deeply impoverished and its local 
government is plagued by corruption. Most villages lack electricity and a Rs2 bag 
of rice is unaffordable for many residents. Ration cards are made available only to 
politicians’ friends and relatives. Politicians reportedly interfere in local elections 
and arrest villagers who refuse to nominate or support them. Lalgarh is, in short, a 
case study in all that is flawed about Indian democracy.521 
Maoists quietly campaigned in Lalgarh for some years. They offered free 
food and medicine to residents, and attended village meetings where they spoke 
about economic exploitation and government corruption. By 2008, Lalgarh had 
become a Maoist stronghold. In November of that year, West Bengal Chief 
Minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee narrowly survived a landmine planted by 
Maoists. The police action that followed – characterized by police brutality, torture 
and vandalism – sparked the Lalgarh resistance. In the subsequent “siege”, the 
Maoists encouraged villagers to fight police with whatever crude weapons they 
possessed and sought their help in transporting weapons and supplies. When Cobra 
Special Forces were brought to the area to hunt for the agitators, the Maoists 
melted into the forest, leaving ghost villages in their wake. Ironically, the lack of 
development in the region hampered the government’s response. In the absence of 
access to potable water, police suffered from mass dehydration and some officers 
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died of heat stroke.522 Nevertheless, during the siege of Lalgarh the government 
struck a blow against the Maoists when the charismatic leader, Kishenji, was shot 
six times and killed.523   
 
4.6  The Absent State 
The Maoists insurgency is often held responsible for the very poverty, 
insecurity and underdevelopment that drive its growth. The Indian government 
blames the Maoists for stalling development efforts in India's poorest states by, for 
example, interfering with road construction.524 India's $40 billion road-building 
program has indeed been disrupted by attacks and threats against contractors, 
especially in Bihar.525 Maoists also threatened mining projects in Jharkhand where 
India's Tata Steel, as well as foreign companies, planned to build multi-billion 
dollar plants. For many years, aluminum companies avoided the bauxite mining 
areas of Andhra Pradesh because of the risks associated with the counter-
insurgency war. 526  
But, while the Naxalite-Maoist movement is treated as a source of India’s 
development failures, it is more a symptom of India's development failures. In The 
Absent State: Insurgency as an Excuse for Misgovernance, two journalists who 
have covered the Maoist movement, Neelesh Misra and Rahul Pandita, argue just 
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that.527 They chronicle how unemployment, starvation, a lack of education and 
healthcare facilities, and widespread misappropriation of development funds has 
fuelled the Maoists in tribal and remote areas. They also examine how a lack of 
security and justice has fuelled vigilantism. They conclude that the Maoist 
movement and other secessionist movements across India are the result of an 
“absent state”.528 However, as some critics have noted529, and as we have already 
seen, an “absent state” (used here to describe an insufficient government response 
to widespread suffering) is not enough to explain the dramatic growth of an armed 
group like the Maoists. After all, desperate economic circumstances and inadequate 
government services are common across India and throughout the wider region. 
Rather, it is the role of the state as a violent enforcer of neo-liberal reforms that has 
generated the Maoists’ recent and dramatic growth.  
 
4.7 Conclusions and Prospects for the Future 
Anti-democratic laws and extreme violence directed against civil society by 
the state have excluded from the political process those marginalized groups that 
form the majority of Maoist supporters and cadres. And by violently enforcing neo-
liberal reforms, the Indian government has made itself more their enemy than ally. 
Speaking specifically of adivasi villagers, Rahul Pandita argues,  
You go to the huts and there is nothing. They have a lot of 
malnutrition…They get mistreated by forest officers, who take their goats 
and their chickens and try to take their wives too. In the old days the 
Adivasis could get a monkey or snake from the forest and drink water from 
a river. Now they find – because of all the mining and industrial processing 
– that the water is contaminated with fluoride and arsenic. The Maoists 
have set up schools in some places which have a mix of education and 
propaganda. They even show BBC science programmes. If you ask the 
Adivasis who they support, they say, ‘The police come here and beat us. 
The Maoists come and demand food, and then go on their way.’ You could 
call them sympathizers.”530 
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Aa lack of genuine democracy in India, that is, the political exclusion of 
marginalized groups through violent means, in combination with the savage 
impacts of neo-liberal reforms on the lowest strata of Indian society, is responsible 
for the Naxalite-Maoist insurgency’s success in the post-Cold War era. Sorely 
pressed by an untenable economic reality, and without legitimate means of 
participating in their own governance, affected communities turned to the only 
other available option: armed struggle. 
The Indian Government has long been eager to proclaim the Maoists’ 
imminent demise. However, today’s CPI-Maoist insurgency is simply the most 
recent manifestation of a conflict that has raged for decades. From the Tebhaga 
uprisings in northern Bengal in 1946, to the Telangana rebellion in Andhra in the 
late 1940s, to the uprising at Naxalbari in 1967, whenever it appeared that the 
rebels were not only defeated but physically exterminated, they re-emerged more 
organized, determined and influential than they were before. So it is today. Far 
from declining, the Maoists have only grown in strength and numbers in the face of 
the government’s increasingly vicious counter-insurgency campaign.  
The Maoists have suffered from the recent deaths of several high-ranking, 
high-profile members. Amongst them was Kishengi, “number 3” in the Maoist 
hierarchy and an expert military strategist; he was also a popular leader whom the 
media had transformed into a near-mythical figure. Other senior leaders have also 
been killed, including Cherukurl Rajkumar alias Azad and Patel Sudhakar Reddy 
alias Surya, while others including Pramod Mishra and Varanasi Subramanium 
have been arrested. These killings are part of a deliberate government strategy to 
decimate the top leadership of the movement, but it is not likely to prove as 
effective as the government might wish.531 According to one observer:  
The Government hopes the insurgency will die down if the top leadership is 
erased. But it won’t be so easy. Over the past few years, Maoists have 
suffered some big losses. But there are still senior leaders around who can 
hold the Maoist cadre together. That apart, leaders like Kishenji have, over 
the years, nurtured and trained a second line of leaders; Orissa-based 
Sabyasachi Panda is one such Maoist commander.532 
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Moreover, as the counter-insurgency war against the Maoists has transformed into 
a genocide conducted against adivasis, the fight is likely to continue with ever 
more resolve. The celebrated Indian writer, Arundhati Roy, eloquently said as 
much when she argued: 
People who have taken to arms have done it with the full knowledge of 
what the consequences of that decision will be. They have done so knowing 
that they are on their own. They know that the new laws of the land 
criminalize the poor and conflate resistance with terrorism. They know that 
appeals to conscience, liberal morality, and sympathetic press coverage will 
not help them now.  They know no international marches, no globalized 
dissent, no famous writers will be around when the bullets fly. Hundreds of 
thousands have broken faith with the institutions of India's democracy. 
Large swathes of the country have fallen out of the government's 
control…The battle stinks of death. It's by no means pretty. How can it be 
when the helmsman of the army of Constraining Ghosts is the ghost of 
Chairman Mao himself? ...Are they Idealists fighting for a Better World? 
Well, anything is better than annihilation.533 
 
India’s recent general elections, in which Congress suffered a humiliating 
defeat at the hands of BJP, offers little prospect for change. The ascension of 
relative outsider Narendra Modi – who famously sold tea at railway stations as a 
boy – to the office of Prime Minister, was hailed worldwide as game changing, and 
as a mandate “to sweep away the cobwebs of bureaucratic and political lethargy 
and unleash India's creative energies.”534  
Modi has, both accurately and ominously, been called “India’s Margaret 
Thatcher”.535 As Chief Minister of Gujarat, he granted soft loans and reduced-cost 
land to private investors, but lagged behind other Indian states in talking poverty, 
illiteracy and infant mortality.536 As Prime Minister, Modi promises to tackle 
India’s “bloated” state sector and undertake massive state and private sector 
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investments to promote economic growth.537 BJP is set to continue, if not speed up, 
neo-liberal reforms and land acquisitions. The party’s election manifesto expressly 
promises to craft environmental laws “that will lead to speedy clearance of projects 
without delay.”538 And, like Congress, BJP state governments have a remarkably 
poor record in protecting the lands and rights of adivasis,539 to say nothing of 
Muslims and other minority communities.540 
As we have seen, the neo-liberal policies that make Modi a darling of the 
West are likely to exacerbate, rather than alleviate, the poverty and inequality that 
motivate Maoists and their supporters. And, if Modi’s reputation as an autocrat 
with “thuggish lieutenants”541 is well-deserved, then the new administration in 
Delhi can be expected to continue the counter-productive counter-insurgency war 
that so effectively swells the Maoists’ ranks. Indeed, as long as it remains one of 
the few credible alternatives to India’s failed liberal democracy, the Naxalite-
Maoist insurgency will most likely continue to survive and thrive in the era of neo-
liberal globalization. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
In 1990, Marxism became extremely unfashionable. With the fall of the 
Berlin Wall and collapse of the Soviet Union, with China fully committed to a 
program of authoritarian state capitalism, and with the welfare state floundering in 
the West after a decade of assaults from the right, capitalism and liberal democracy 
seemed very much in the ascendancy. As Jorge Castañeda noted in Leftovers, the 
neo-liberal option was “popular, successful and omnipresent.”542 Further: 
…the single path seemed to be the right path. Conversely, anything that 
smacked of economic statism, social redistribution, subsidies, and anti-
globalization movements was perceived as anachronistic and mistaken, in 
good faith or with a hidden agenda.543 
 
Marxists were, and remain, derided as “dinosaurs”, and their ideology and 
prescriptions for social reform are dismissed as “dead mantras”. Challenged by 
both the “clash of civilizations” theory and the “end of history” theory, Marxism 
indeed seemed to be a relic of another time. However, regardless of the general 
academic consensus, recent developments around the world suggest that the specter 
of Marxism has not been altogether banished.  
 
5.1 Shared Traits and Factors in Recent Growth 
Despite emerging on two different continents half a world away, and in the 
context of dramatically different national histories and cultures, FARC and the 
Naxalite-Maoist insurgency share common origins, qualities and aspirations. Both 
groups have roots in economic and political crises in the 1960s. Both have enjoyed 
a consistent leadership over many decades and have a rank and file membership 
that is young and diverse, including small farmers and rural laborers, indigenous 
peoples and other racial and religious minorities, displaced persons, urban 
intellectuals and other sectors of the urban workforce. Both groups also boast a 
remarkably high number of women members. They have both constructed 
platforms that address the concerns of small farmers and rural laborers, including 
                                                       
542 Castañeda, “Where Do We Go From Here?” In Leftovers, 231. 
543 Castañeda, “Where Do We Go From Here?” In Leftovers, 231. 
 105 
calling for major land reforms, the provision of government services to needy rural 
areas, and greater state control over strategic natural resources. They express 
concerns about the impacts of industrial development, and especially of green 
revolution technologies, on the environment and small farming economy. They 
also seek to address discrimination and violence against women and against 
indigenous peoples and other minority communities.544 Finally, both FARC and the 
Maoists reject participation in the electoral process, instead embracing armed 
struggle as the only means of achieving their political goals. 
 Despite wildly different academic narratives about Colombia and India, the 
growth of FARC and the Naxalite-Maoist Insurgency was also spurred by similar 
economic and political developments in the post-Cold War period. In both 
Colombia and India, swift and dramatic neo-liberal reforms have, despite praise 
from economists and accelerating GDP growth rates, led to worsening quality of 
life indicators and greater inequality. These reforms also reduced or eliminated the 
public services on which vulnerable groups relied and ultimately drove millions of 
families into poverty. In both countries, the use of state violence to implement 
these reforms, and continued or increased use of state violence to quell popular 
dissent, led to a shrinking space for democratic participation and a growing sense 
among vulnerable groups that “legitimate” mechanisms of government cannot or 
will not address their needs. As we have seen, these shared factors led to the 
growth of armed rebel groups that many believe, rightly or wrongly, are the only 
alternative to an ostensibly democratic regime that does not represent them.   
 
5.2 Challenging the Clash of Civilizations and the End of History 
 The dramatic growth of both FARC and the Naxalite-Maoist insurgency 
challenges the clash of civilizations theory. Both these movements are culturally, 
ethnically and religiously diverse groups united by shared political and economic 
goals. While FARC began as a rural, peasant-led organization, its membership now 
reflects the diversity of Colombian society, and includes indigenous and Afro-
Colombians, displaced peoples, union members and other sectors of the urban 
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workforce, as well as urban intellectuals. Similarly, the Naxalite-Maoist movement 
has united Hindus and Muslims of all castes, including dalits, with diverse tribal 
populations (all of which speak different languages and belong to different 
religious traditions), and small farmers, sharecroppers and landless laborers across 
the country. But rather than being driven to sectarian conflict, as the clash of 
civilizations theory predicts, in both cases diverse peoples have joined movements 
that are officially secular, reject caste and race discrimination, and embrace 
linguistic and cultural differences. These movements demonstrate that instead of 
being beholden to monolithic religious, cultural and ethnic values identities, 
communities can and will overcome communal conflict for the sake of shared 
economic and political goals. 
  The dramatic growth in membership, territory and military effectiveness of 
both FARC and the Naxalite-Maoist insurgency also challenges the “end of 
history” theory. Savagely exploited but otherwise unwelcome in a new economic 
regime, frustrated by their governments’ inability or unwillingness to address their 
grievances, and increasingly subjected to coercion in the form of state violence, 
tens of thousands of Colombians and Indians have taken up arms in Marxist rebel 
movements. Hundreds of thousands more, struggling with neo-liberal reforms and 
voiceless in the legitimate political system have turned to the guerrillas for 
assistance in meeting their needs and for political representation. Anachronistic and 
mistaken or not, FARC and the Naxalite-Maoists have kept Marxism very much 
newsworthy in the twentieth century. That both the Colombian and Indian 
governments consider these groups to be the single greatest threats to internal 
security, and the focus of multi-billion dollar, decades-long counter-insurgency 
campaigns, suggests that liberal democracy is not quite as incontrovertible, 
inexorable or triumphant as it is often said to be.  
 
5.3 The Spectre of Marx and the Future of Liberal Democracy 
Even in the West – the democratic heartland – the triumph of liberal 
democracy seems to be wobbling. In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis there has 
been a revival of interest in all things Marxist. That year, a survey by Reuters of 
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former East Germans revealed that over half believed the free market was 
“unsuitable” and 43% wanted a return to socialism.545 Since 2008, sales of Capital, 
the Grundrisse and The Communist Manifesto have risen markedly.546 A new 
“publishing industry” has produced a slew of new academic works that reexamine 
Marxist thought and critique capitalism. Among the more significant English-
language texts are Alain Badiou’s The Communist Hypothesis and Slavoj Zizek’s 
The Idea of Communism and Less than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of 
Dialectical Materialism.547 
The enthusiasm has spread beyond academia. A “glut” of popular books, 
including Terry Eagleton’s Why Marx Was Right and Benjamin Kunkel’s Utopia or 
Bust: A Guide to the Present Crisis, has also hit bookshelves.548 The revival of 
Marxism has also become something of a topic du jour among editorialists at major 
international papers and news outlets. What can account for this bizarre 
development? According to Owen Jones, author of the 2011 bestseller Chavs: The 
Demonization of the Working Class, 
Class is back in our reality because the economic crisis affects people in 
different ways and because the Coalition [government of the United 
Kingdom] mantra that ‘we’re all in this together’ is offensive and ludicrous. 
Its impossible to argue now as was argued in the 1990s that we’re all 
middle class.549 
 
This revival of interest has been especially strong among young people. For 
example, the UK-based Socialist Workers Party has noticed growing membership 
and increased interest in their events among young Britons.550  
It is peculiar that the generation that grew up in the liberal utopia, untainted 
by the radicalism of the 1960s and with the spectacular collapse of the Soviet 
Union an impossible to miss cautionary tale, should nevertheless fall under Marx’s 
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spell. In “Why Marxism is on the Rise Again”, Stuart Jeffries puts it down to just 
that: young people do not remember the Soviet Union. For them, 
[Marxism] is untainted by association with Stalinist gulags. For younger 
people too, Francis Fukuyama’s triumphalism in his 1992 book The End of 
History – in which capitalism seemed incontrovertible, its overthrow 
impossible to imagine – exercises less of a choke-hold on their imaginations 
than it does on those of their elders.551 
Of course, this improbable turn of events has been met with a certain amount of 
disbelief, dismay and hysterical hand wringing in ivory towers. Writing for the 
journal World Affairs, Alan Johnson, professor of democratic theory and practice at 
Edge Hill University, was particularly harsh in “The New Communism: 
Resurrecting the Utopian Delusion”: 
A specter is haunting the academy – the specter of “New Communism”. A 
worldview recently the source of immense suffering and misery, and 
responsible for more deaths than fascism and Nazism, is mounting a 
comeback; a new form of left-wing totalitarianism that enjoys intellectual 
celebrity but aspires to political power…The New Communism matters not 
because of its intellectual merits but because it may yet influence layers of 
young Europeans in the context of an exhausted social democracy, austerity 
and a self-loathing intellectual culture.552 
 
Evidently, for some, the renaissance of interest in Marxism is not just folly but an 
apologia for the worst excesses of any tyrant who ever presumed to wear a red star 
on his cap.553 Millions of people in Colombia and India – whether they be 
guerrillas or tribals, paras or SPOs – might beg to disagree. For many, Marxist-
inspired movements offer protection from the tyranny and excesses of liberal 
democracy.  
Is liberal democracy in terminal crisis? One would hardly think so. Still, to 
extend the ghoulish metaphor for which Marxism seems to have an affinity, old 
ghosts do appear to be rising. The renewed popular and academic interest in 
Marxism in the West suggests that, even in the cradle of liberal democracy, its 
hegemony is not quite as certain as before. Meanwhile, across the Third World, 
Marxist and Maoist-inspired movements have been flourishing since the end of the 
Cold War, and Marxist guerrilla armies continue to operate. As we have seen, it 
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was the excesses of liberal democratic regimes in the post-Cold War era that 
nurtured the revival of Marxist activism and lead to the dramatic growth of Marxist 
rebel armies. Indeed, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the 
Naxalite-Maoist insurgency are among the most potent indications that Marxist-
inspired movements across the globe may flourish precisely because of the triumph 
of liberal democracy.  
 Whether Marxism, Leninism, Maoism or any of their infinite hyphenated 
variations are dated or misguided seems increasingly irrelevant. The fact of the 
matter is that for tens of thousands of people, on two different continents and at 
opposite ends of the globe, Marxism is the only path remaining to them. Liberal 
democracy as it is practiced in Colombia and India is a system within which 
economically vulnerable groups are voiceless and permanently excluded from 
mechanisms of power. Worse still, liberal democracy has become an ideology of 
annihilation. If nothing else, Marxism, or at least those rebel armies that claim to 
embody its ideals, represents immediate survival. And in the long term, Marxism 
offers them a different future, one where they have a place in a new economy and a 
voice in a new system of governance. Is it any wonder that when faced with savage 
neo-liberal reforms and without a legitimate avenue for participating in the 
democratic system, affected communities have turned to armed revolution? To 
quote the great man himself, they have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a 
world to win. 
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